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Notes and Comments
Protective Cruelty: State v. Yanez and
Strict Liability as to Age in
Statutory Rape
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Yanez, 1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court examined
for the first time the issue of whether reasonable mistake as to age
is a valid defense to a charge of statutory rape/child molestation.
Before the Court was Alejandro Yanez, whose summer fling as a
youth of eighteen had ended in disaster. During July of 1993, Ale-
jandro had a sexual encounter with a girl identified as "Allison,"
with whom he had a passing acquaintance over the past year and a
half.2 According to Alejandro, Allison told him that she was six-
teen.3 Because of Allison's appearance and behavior, Alejandro
never considered that he might have reason to doubt her.4 Had
Alejandro been correct in his belief as to Allison's age, he would
have faced no criminal charges at all as a result of his encounter
with Allison. Under Rhode Island's third degree sexual assault
statute, sixteen is the age of consent to sexual intercourse, unless
the actor is under eighteen, in which case the age of consent is
fourteen.5 However, a few weeks after his encounter, the police
informed Alejandro that Allison was actually six weeks short of
1. 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998) (Flanders, J., dissenting).
2. See id. at 760.
3. See id. at 761.
4. See Ana Cabrera, The Miseducation of Alejandro Yanez, Prov. Phoenix,
Jan. 29- Feb. 4, 1999, at 8.
5. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 ("A person is guilty of third degree sexual
assault if he or she is over the age of eighteen (18) years and engaged in sexual
penetration with another person over the age of fourteen (14) years and under the
age of consent, sixteen (16) years of age.") (emphasis added).
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fourteen. 6 Therefore, Allison fell under the aegis of the first degree
child molestation statute, which carries a mandatory twenty-year
penalty. 7
At trial, Alejandro attempted to defend himself on the grounds
that he had honestly and reasonably believed that Allison was six-
teen.8 The trial judge refused to permit this defense.9 Alejandro
was then convicted. 10 In a 4-1 decision, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court upheld Alejandro's conviction, concluding that the General
Assembly's failure to specifically provide for the defense of reason-
able mistake as to age should be construed as a legislative intent to
deny the defense." The denial of this defense, the Yanez majority
observed, was necessary to protect youths and children from sex-
ual abuse. 12 Therefore, the Yanez majority held, the trial judge
correctly ruled that Alejandro could not present any evidence on
that issue of his knowledge or belief as to Allison's age. Further-
more, the trial justice had correctly refused to instruct the jury
that it could consider the issue when determining his guilt.' 3
Alejandro's plight is hardly unique 14 or new, but has been a
trap for the unwary over the past century. As the Yanez majority
acknowledges, it is a longstanding rule of Anglo-American law that
most crimes consist of both an actus rea-that is, a forbidden act-
6. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 761.
7. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) ("A person is
guilty of first degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual
penetration with a person fourteen (14) years of age or under."); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-37-8.2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) ("Every person who shall commit first de-
gree child molestation sexual assault shall be imprisoned for a period of not less
than twenty (20) years and may be imprisoned for life."). Had Allison been but a
few weeks older, Alejandro would have been charged with third degree sexual as-
sault under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 (1956) (1994 Reenactment). Under R.I. Gen.
Laws 11-37-7 (1956) (1994 Reenactment), Alejandro could then only have received
a maximum of five years imprisonment for third degree sexual assault, or the
judge may have chosen to give no time at all.
8. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 761-62.
9. See id. at 762.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 766.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 760.
14. According to then-Attorney General Jeffrey B. Pine, the issue of mistake
as to age has arisen in other recent cases involving sexual abuse charges. See
Laura Meade Kirk, Consensual Sex with Girl, 13, Was Molestation, Justices Rule,
Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 13, 1998, at B1, available in 1998 WL 12199878.
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and a mens rea-an intent to do the forbidden act.15 As a natural
extension of the mens rea requirement, it is equally well-recog-
nized that a person who has done a forbidden act under a reason-
able and honest mistake or ignorance of the facts surrounding his
conduct did not possess a mens rea, and therefore has a valid de-
fense. 16 The mens rea requirement and the mistake of fact de-
fense, then, serve a key screening function in our criminal justice
system. Both prevent the conviction, punishment, and social dis-
grace of those who had no intent to engage in any criminal activity,
and therefore have shown no need for corrective action. Further-
more, the mens rea requirement and the mistake of fact defense
also protects those who themselves may have been the victims of
the bad faith of another-for example, the unaware possessor of
narcotics, 17 or stolen goods.18
Although mens rea is central to our legal tradition, since the
19th century most courts have interpreted statutory rape and child
molestation laws as an exception to this rule with respect to the
complainant's age.' 9 Obviously, most people can recognize that
reasonable and honest mistakes can be made as to the age of a
sexual partner-including Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General at the
time of Alejandro's appeal, who would concede that "young people
may be growing up faster."20 However, many still insist that the
imposition of strict liability as to age in statutory rape and child
molestation is a protective cruelty, necessary to protect children
and youths from sexual exploitation.2 ' As Attorney General Pine
explained: "If an adult male or adult person engages in a sexual
assault with an underage victim, then the excuse that she didn't
15. See id. at 766 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252
(1952)).
16. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law
577 (1986).
17. See, eg., State v. Gilman, 291 A.2d 425, 430 (R.I. 1975).
18. See, eg., State v. Motyka, 298 A.2d 793, 794 (R.I. 1973).
19. See Larry W. Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Stat-
utory Rape, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 105, 105-06, nn. 3-11 (1965).
20. Meade Kirk, supra note 14, at B1. See also H.R. Rep. No. 99-594, at 18
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6186, 6198 ("However, where the conduct is
noncoercive and involves persons who are not so young that a mistake about age
would not be 'a dramatic departure from societal norms,' the Committee believes a
reasonable mistake about age defense appropriate.").
21. See, eg., State v. Owen, 724 A.2d 43, 52 (Md. 1999) (Eldridge, J., concur-
ring in result only) (Bell, C.J., & Cathell, J., dissenting).
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look underage or she didn't act underage, that should not be avail-
able in our view."2 2
Beyond a doubt, the prevention of sexual abuse of youths and
children is a valid goal. However, the judicial denial of the defense
of reasonable mistake as to age has also been criticized as legally
erroneous from its inception in the late 19th century. 23 Addition-
ally, serious questions exist as to whether strict liability ultimately
advances the goal of preventing sexual abuse.24 As a result of
these criticisms, many jurisdictions have begun to permit the
defense. 25
Despite the considerable questions as to the validity of strict
liability as to age, the Yanez majority has interpreted the Rhode
Island first degree child molestation statute as imposing strict lia-
bility as to age. It is the position of this paper that the Yanez ma-
jority's reading of strict liability into the child molestation statute
represents a major reversal of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
earlier refusals to read strict liability into statutory silence when
interpreting other criminal statutes. Furthermore, the Yanez ma-
jority's reading of the child molestation statutes in this instance
represents a retreat from its earlier practice of interpreting the in-
tent elements of those statutes in order to ensure that persons who
did not intend to abuse children were not caught in their web.
Part I of this case note provides the facts and procedural his-
tory of Alejandro's case. Part II traces the historical background of
how statutory rape and child molestation came to be regarded as a
strict-liability crime with respect to the complainant's age by a ma-
jority of jurisdictions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and
how that majority position was eroded in the later half of the 20th
century. Part III discusses the weaknesses of the Yanez majority's
legal reasoning in imposing strict liability as to the complainant's
age, particularly in light of its inconsistency with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's earlier decisions evincing a distinct distaste for
strict liability interpretations, both in criminal laws generally as
well as in the child molestation statutes. Finally, Part IV explores
the weakness of the Yanez majority's policy arguments in favor of
22. See Meade Kirk, supra note 14, at B1, available in 1998 WL 12199878.
23. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 19, at 110-12.
24. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 213.6, cmt. 2 at 415 (1980); Myers, supra
note 19, at 120-24.
25. See discussion at IIB, infra.
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imposing strict liability as to age in the statutory rape/child moles-
tation statues.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Factual Background
Alejandro Yanez first met Allison at a local Portuguese festival
at St. Joseph's Church in West Warwick in August, 1992.26 He
was briefly introduced to Allison through his brother, Victor, who
dated Allison's aunt.27 For approximately the next year, Alejandro
only saw Allison in passing.28 However, in the summer of 1993,
their relationship changed. In mid-July, Alejandro was driving
down the street in his white convertible Trans Am, saw Allison
wave to him, and impulsively turned around and offered her a
ride.29 The two conversed briefly, and Alejandro gave Allison his
telephone number.30 The two talked on the phone later that
night.31 The day after, Alejandro called while Allison was out,
leaving a message with either Allison's sister or mother.32 Allison
returned the call and the two arranged to meet later at St. Jo-
26. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 760 (R.I. 1998). Under R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-37-8.5 (1956) (1994 Reenactment), the case file itself is confidential. However,
those portions of the record appended to the appellate briefs are available for pub-
lic viewing. According to that portion of the record, Allison described herself as
being 5 feet, 3 inches in height at this first meeting. See Trial Tr. at 50 (No. K1/94-
0146), appended to Br. for Appellant-Defendant (No. 97-0110 C.A.). She also
claimed that she had not "developed" at the time she met Alejandro, or at the time
of their encounters. See Trial Tr. at 50-52, appended to Br. of Appellee. However,
she testified that she wore a bra at the time of her encounter with Alejandro. See
id. at 38. Furthermore, she testified that at the time of her encounter with Alejan-
dro, she had been menstruating for about a year, and also wore cosmetics. See id.
at 50-52.
27. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 760.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. According to the testimony of Allison's mother, Alejandro had
called Allison on the telephone on other occasions. See Trial Tr. at 96, appended to
Br. of Appellee. In fact, at one point, Allison's mother picked up the extension
while they were talking, and heard them discussing plans to meet at the mall. See
id. The fact that Alejandro apparently quite openly called Allison at her home, and
the fact that Allison's mother knew all about the contacts between the two, directly
contradicts the Yanez majority's assertion that "[t]he trial justice appropriately ob-
served that there was some measure of planning involved with Yanez's encounters
with Allison which were aimed at avoiding detection by her mother." Yanez, 716
A.2d at 769-70.
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seph's.33 Allison kept her date with Alejandro, and the two went
for a ride in Alejandro's Trans Am.34 Eventually, the two went to
an apartment belonging to Alejandro's friend, where they engaged
in consensual sexual intercourse in a back bedroom. 35
Allison arrived at home later that night, and proceeded to take
a shower.36 Allison's mother found Allison's stained underwear on
the bathroom floor, and confronted Allison as to whether or not she
had had sexy7 At first, Allison denied having had sex.38 Later,
she admitted to having sex.39 Allison's mother then called the po-
lice. 40 Allison then lied to her mother and police as to the identity
of her partner and the circumstances under which she had had sex,
informing them that she had met a man named Derek at the mall,
and then accompanied him to a motel.41 As she would explain at
trial, she had lied "[blecause we were pretty-we was friends or
whatever and I didn't want to get him in any trouble."42 Later,
Allison became fearful that she had become pregnant or contracted
a bladder infection as a result of her encounter with Alejandro, and
ultimately confided in a family friend that Alejandro had been her
sexual partner.43 The friend informed Allison's mother.4 Some
time later, Allison would discover that she was pregnant and iden-
tified Alejandro as the father.45 She knew that Alejandro was not
the father, because she had taken several pregnancy tests after her
encounters with him, and all had been negative. 46 However, as
33. See Yanez, 716 A.2d. at 760-61.
34. See id. at 761.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Trial Tr. at 71-73, appended to Br. for Appellant-Defendant.
42. Trial Tr. at 82, appended to Br. for Appellee. That portion of the record
available to the public is somewhat unclear as to the time and sequence of events,
or whether the two considered themselves to be in a dating relationship. According
to the record, on cross-examination, Allison would testify that the two engaged in
intercourse twice before the incident for which Alejandro was indicted. See id. at
772 n.12 (Flanders, J., dissenting). Alejandro claimed that he asked Allison to
move in with him. See Trial Tr. at 85-86, appended to Br. for Appellant-Defendant.
See also Cabrera, supra note 4, at 8 (describing relationship between the two).
43. See Trial Tr. at 43, appended to Br. for Appellee.
44. See id. at 97.
45. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 771.
46. See Trial Tr. at 141-42, appended to Br. for Appellee.
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she would admit on cross-examination at trial, Allison lied about
the true identity of the father of her child because she did not want
her mother to know that she had had sex with somebody else.47
Alejandro voluntarily appeared at the West Warwick police
station for questioning on August 1, 1993.48 When questioned,
Alejandro admitted that he and Allison had sex.49 The investigat-
ing officer told Alejandro that he was accused of having sex with a
girl of thirteen. 50 Alejandro said that he had no idea what the of-
ficer was talking about.51 When the officer showed Alejandro Al-
lison's statement, Alejandro told the officer that Allison was
sixteen, not thirteen.52 Alejandro also gave a written statement to
the police indicating that Allison had told him that she was six-
teen.53 Alejandro was then charged with first degree child
molestation. 54
At trial, Alejandro attempted to introduce evidence regarding
the honesty and reasonableness of his mistaken belief that Allison
was sixteen years old.55 He offered an account of a discussion be-
tween himself and Allison about her possibly moving in with
him.56 During the conversation, Alejandro asked her age, and Al-
lison said she was sixteen.57 He then remarked, "Well, you only
have two more years at home."58 Alejandro also offered his own
47. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 761. The first degree child molestation statute has
been interpreted to allow the conviction of all persons engaging in sexual penetra-
tion of a person under 14-even if that "person" is himself under 14. See In re
Odell, 672 A.2d 457, 459-60 (R.I. 1996). Therefore, if Allison conceived before turn-
ing 14, the true father of the child could also face charges of first degree child
molestation. If Allison had conceived after turning 14, and the true father were
over 18, then the true father could face charges of third-degree sexual assault. See
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 (1956) (1994 Reenactment). However, it is unclear
whether the Attorney General's office has pursued the matter against the baby's
true father; the Attorney General's office refuses to comment on this case until
Alejandro is found. See Cabrera, supra note 4, at 8.
48. See Trial Tr. at 122, appended to Br. for Appellant-Defendant; Cabrera,
supra note 4, at 8.
49. See Trial Tr. at 128, appended to Br. for Appellant-Defendant.
50. See id. at 132.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Trial Tr. at 128, appended to Br. for Appellee.
54. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 761 (R.I. 1998).
55. See id. at 761-62.
56. See Trial Tr. at 85-86, appended to Br. for Appellant-Defendant.
57. See id.
58. Id.
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testimony regarding her physical development, appearance, and
ability to communicate. 59 Alejandro was also prepared to intro-
duce corroborating evidence from others regarding Allison's ability
to give an impression of greater maturity.60 This proffered corrob-
oration included the testimony of a social worker from the Rhode
Island Department of Children, Youth, and Families, who had
written in a report, some months before Allison's encounters with
Alejandro, that "[Allison] also looks much older than her age."61
The trial justice, Joseph F. Rodgers, Jr., refused to allow any of
this testimony, indicating that in the majority of jurisdictions, the
defense of reasonable mistake as to age is not available to a de-
fendant where the conduct in question is criminal because the vic-
tim is a minor.62
At trial, Allison testified that she told Alejandro that she was
thirteen, and denied ever telling him that she was sixteen.63 Ale-
jandro attempted to impeach this testimony by introducing Al-
lison's other misrepresentations, namely, her having falsely
accused him of having fathered her child.64 The trial court refused
to allow this line of questioning.65 Because Alejandro's belief as to
Allison's age was not a defense, the trial court reasoned, Allison's
credibility as to what she told Alejandro about her age was not at
issue.66
Judge Rodgers then specifically instructed the jury that rea-
sonable mistake as to Allison's age was not a defense.67 The jury
convicted Alejandro of first degree child molestation sexual assault
59. See id.
60. See id. at 86-88.
61. Id. at 8, 87.
62. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 762 (R.I. 1998).
63. See Trial Tr. at 13, 64, appended to Br. for Appellant-Defendant. At trial,
Allison's mother also testified that at some point before Alejandro's sexual en-
counters with Allison, she told Alejandro Allison's age. Specifically, Allison's
mother testified to an occasion when Alejandro, his brother, Allison's mother, and
Allison's aunt arrived at Allison's home after an evening out. Alejandro had in-
quired as to the identity of two girls in the bedroom window. Allison's mother
testified that she told him that the two girls were her daughters, aged 11 and 12,
and told him to "stay away." See Trial Tr. at 93-94, appended to Br. for Appellee.
64. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 771.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 762
PROTECTIVE CRUELTY
after four hours of deliberation.6 8 Judge Rodgers, after agonized
reflection, took the "middle ground" of giving Alejandro two years
to serve, and suspending the rest: "Very, very few cases have trou-
bled me over the last 22 years."69 Judge Rodgers recognized the
harshness of the result to Alejandro: "It's not as if someone went in
and molested a little girl."70 However, he indicated that he still
felt a public example needed to be made "[to let [the public] know
that if they succumb to passion with someone under 14 years of
age, there's a very high price to pay."71 Pursuant to statue, Rod-
gers also ordered Alejandro to register as a sex offender.72 Judge
Rodgers also ordered Alejandro not to have any contact with Al-
lison for twenty years.73
B. The Rhode Island Supreme Court Speaks
Alejandro appealed, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court up-
held the trial court's refusal to allow Alejandro to use reasonable
mistake as to Allison's age as a defense to the charge of first degree
child molestation.7 4 The Yanez majority began its decision by not-
ing that only four jurisdictions had judicially accepted the mistake
of fact defense for statutory rape-California, Utah, New Mexico,
and Alaska.75 The Yanez majority, however, distinguished the
68. See Man Convicted of Molestation, Prov. J. Bull., April 26, 1996, at C2,
available in 1996 WL 9381819.
69. Peter DuJardin, Judge Troubled by Mandatory Sentence in Molestation
Case, Prov. J. Bull., July 15, 1996, at C3, available in 1996 WL 11079983. As
Justice Flanders' dissent points out, the fact that 18 years of Alejandro's sentence
was suspended is a cold comfort, since he would be subject to re-imprisonment for
the remainder of his term for petty offenses. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 772 n.10
(Flanders, J., dissenting).
70. Laura Meade Kirk, Man Flees Rather Than Go to Prison for Molestation,
Prov. J. Bull., Sept. 19, 1998, at A3, available in 1998 WL 19865711.
71. DuJardin, supra note 69, at C-3.
72. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 762.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 761.
75. See id. at 763-64 (citing People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964);
State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984); Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249 (N.M. 1990);
State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978))). In addition to these four jurisdic-
tions, Tennessee, in State v. Parker, 887 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), ac-
knowledged that the defendant's intent as to age must be, as with any other crime,
"intentional, knowing, or. reckless." Id. at 888. The defendant's conviction in this
case was upheld because the court found that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to find that the defendant had been at least reckless as to the complainant's
age. See id.
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California and Utah decisions of them on the grounds that their
holdings had rested upon provisions in their states' criminal codes
specifically requiring a mens rea for all crimes.7 6 The Yanez major-
ity then distinguished the New Mexico and Alaska cases on the
grounds that they had involved complainants aged fifteen, while
Allison was nearly fourteen.77
Turning to the Rhode Island's own laws, the Yanez majority
analyzed the sexual assault provisions of Chapter 11-37 to deter-
mine whether the General Assembly intended to make first degree
child molestation a strict liability crime.7 s The majority noted that
mental elements had been provided for other sexual assaults, such
as when the defendant had intercourse with a person that he or
she "knew or should have known" was mentally or physically dis-
abled," or had engaged in sexual penetration under the guise of a
medical examination. 79 Therefore, the Yanez majority reasoned,
the General Assembly's silence as to whether or not to permit the
reasonable mistake of age was deliberate.80 The General Assem-
bly, the Yanez majority concluded, had specifically intended to
deny a reasonable mistake as to age defense in order to effectuate
the statute's protective purpose.81 The majority also rejected
Yanez's argument that the imposition of strict liability as to age in
the child molestation statutes violated his due process rights.82
The Yanez court acknowledged that mens rea was traditionally
considered an element of serious crimes.83 However, since statu-
tory rape had long been considered a strict liability offense with
respect to the complainant's age, the court concluded that the mis-
take of age defense did not qualify as a traditional, fundamental
76. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 763.
77. See id. at 763-64.
78. See id. at 764-66.
79. Id. at 765 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
80. Although not called upon to make any holding on R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6
(1956) (1994 Reenactment) (third degree sexual assault), the Court took care to
point out that this statute, too, lacks a mental element and is also designed to
protect the underaged. See Yanez, 716 A.2d. at 766 & n.5.
81. See id at 766.
82. See id. at 767-68.
83. See id. at 766 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252
(1952)).
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principle of justice, and therefore, no due process violation had
occurred.8 4
Justice Flanders, in his dissent, cited a number of earlier cases
interpreting the child molestation statutes that had demanded a
mens rea,85 and had in fact suggested that a reasonable mistake as
to identity would be accepted.8 6 The majority distinguished all of
these cases, stating that they had involved accidental touching,
and therefore pertained to the mens rea of the accused in making
contact with the complainant.8 7 These cases, the Yanez majority
held, should not be read so broadly as to require mens rea as to
age.88
The court also discussed policy reasons for denying the reason-
able mistake as to age defense.8 9 The dissenting Justice Flanders
had argued that this case was particularly worthy of the reason-
able mistake of age defense because of the relative youth and close-
ness of age of the parties involved. 90 The Yanez majority, however,
noted that strict liability with respect to age for statutory rape or
child molestation had long been considered necessary, because al-
lowing the defense of reasonable mistake as to age would strip
youths of the protections afforded by the statute.91 If the court
were to allow the defense of reasonable mistake as to age here, the
Yanez majority observed, that defense would be available to any-
one accused of child molestation. 92 Furthermore, allowing the de-
fense of reasonable mistake as to age in this case "would open the
door to the introduction of evidence concerning a victim's past sex-
ual conduct, evidence that the General Assembly has already
sought to restrict through the enactment of the rape-shield stat-
84. See id. (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.8 (1952);
United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Brooks, 841 F.2d 268, 270 (9th Cir. 1988); Nelson v. Moriarty, 484 F.2d 1034, 1035
(1st Cir. 1973); State v. Stiffler, 763 P.2d 308, 310 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988)).
85. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 773-75 (Flanders, J., dissenting) (citing State v.
Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I. 1996); State v. Griffith, 660 A.2d 704 (R.I. 1995); State
v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528 (R.I. 1992))).
86. See id. (Flanders, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Tevay, 707 A.2d 700 (R.I.
1998)).
87. See id. at 768-69.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 769-71.
90. See id. at 771-72 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 769 (citing Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
Colum. L. Rev. 55, 73-74 (1933)).
92. See id. at 770.
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ute."93 Finally, the court expressed concerns that allowing the de-
fense would produce the incongruous result of leading to the
presentation of evidence of consent by the defendant, where child
molestation did not permit consent as a defense. 94 At most, the
court concluded, a reasonable mistake as to age should be consid-
ered when determining the sentence. 95
Since reasonable mistake of age was not an available defense,
the majority held, the trial justice did not err in limiting the cross-
examination of Allison.96 Alejandro wished to impeach the credi-
bility of Allison regarding her allegations that she told him that
she was only thirteen, and had therefore sought to cross-examine
Allison about her falsely identifying Alejandro as the father of her
child.9 7 However, the majority held that because reasonable mis-
take as to Allison's age was not a defense, it was irrelevant
whether Allison had made any representations to Alejandro re-
garding her age.98 Therefore, the trial court had not erred when
preventing Alejandro from impeaching Allison's testimony about
what she had told him about her age. 99
C. Epilogue
The supreme court remanded Alejandro's case to the superior
court for sentencing. °00 Since his encounter with Allison, Alejan-
dro met and married another woman, Gisel.1° 1 At the time the
supreme court denied Alejandro's appeal, he and Gisel already had
one daughter, and had another child on the way. 10 2 Alejandro did
not report to the superior court on the morning of his sentencing,
September 17, 1998.103 Instead, he fled the country, leaving his
attorney a note stating that he could not go to prison and be sepa-
rated from his family.10 4 Furthermore, he could not bear the dis-
grace to himself and his family of his being forever branded a
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 771.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 772.
101. See Cabrera, supra note 4, at 8.
102. See id.
103. See Meade Kirk, supra note 70, at A3.
104. See id.
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"perpetual child molester."105 After giving birth, Gisel and the
children followed Alejandro in his flight from Rhode Island author-
ities. 10 6 As of this date, Alejandro has avoided capture.
III. STRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN STATUTORY RAPE:
A GENERAL BACKGROUND
The Yanez majority based its holdings on legislative intent
and due process partly on the idea that the defense has tradition-
ally been denied in the majority of jurisdictions. 107 The Yanez ma-
jority, however, failed to recognize that this tradition began with
an erroneous and anachronistic legal reasoning that has been
sharply criticized by a number of commentators. 10 8 Furthermore,
this "traditional" exception to the general mens rea rule has been
quite short-lived when contrasted with the centuries-old insistence
upon a mens rea element for serious crimes. The imposition of
strict liability only arose during the latter quarter of the 19th cen-
tury. However, today-barely one hundred years later-the
emerging trend is to allow the defense to some degree, particularly
as to older youths.
A. Strict Liability and Statutory Rape/Child Molestation:
Early Views
Both the requirements of mens rea and the legal prohibitions
against sexual conduct with a person under a particular age are
part of our common-law heritage originating in medieval England.
However, it was not until the 19th century that the American
courts divorced mens rea from the legal prohibitions against sexual
conduct with a female under a certain age. This development ap-
pears to have arisen partially as a result of Victorian morals and
105. Id.
106. See Cabrera, supra note 4, at 8.
107. See Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 763-64 (R.I. 1998).
108. See, eg., State v. Garnett, 632 A.2d 797, 805-24 (Md. 1993) (Eldridge, J. &
Bell, J., filing separate dissents); People v. Cash, 351 N.W. 2d 822, 830-31 (Mich.
1984) (Kavanagh, J., dissenting); Jenkins v. State, 877 P.2d 1063, 1067-68 (Nev.
1994) (Springer, J. & Rose, C.J., dissenting); Myers, supra note 19; Richard A.
Tonry, Comments, Statutory Rape: A Critique, 26 La. L. Rev. 105 (1965); J. Law-
rence Hamil, Current Decisions, 37 U. Colo. L. Rev. (1965); Case Comments, 50
Minn. L. Rev. 170 (1965); Recent Cases, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 244 (1964); Recent Deci-
sions, 33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 588 (1965); Brian Edward Smith, Casenotes, 7 Ariz.
L. Rev. 324 (1966); George Thacker, Student Notes, 5 J. Fam. L. 107 (1965); Crimi-
nal Law, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1257 (1965).
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partially as a general confusion as to when the new strict criminal
liability laws were properly applied.
The Anglo-American tradition's first mention of criminal
prohibitions against intercourse with a female under a certain age,
whether consensual or not, appeared in the 1275 Statute of West-
minster 1.109 According to Sir Edward Coke, the age of consent
was twelve, the age at which a female could consent to mar-
riage.110 Under this statute, intercourse with a female under a
particular age, whether consensual or not, was classified as a spe-
cies of rape."' The commonly supplied rationale for that classifi-
cation was that a female of such a young age was incapable of
giving valid consent to intercourse because "by reason of her
tender years she is incapable of judgment and discretion."" 2 In
1576, legislative attention would turn to the issue of sexual con-
duct with very young females; under the Statute of Elizabeth, "the
abominable wickedness of carnally knowing or abusing any woman
child under the age of ten years," was considered a felony without
benefit of clergy."13
109. See Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13 (1275); 1E. Coke, The Second
Part of the Institute of the Laws of England 179 (1797):
And the king prohibiteth that none do ravish, nor take away by force, any
maiden within age (neither by her own consent, nor without) nor any wife
or maiden of full age, nor any other woman against her will; and if any do,
at his suit that will sue within fourty days, the king shall do common
right, and if none commence his suit within fourty days, the king shall
sue; and such as be found culpable, shall have two years imprisonment,
and after shall fine at the king's pleasure; and if they have not whereof,
they shall be punished by longer imprisonment according as trespass
requireth.
Id.
Several years later, forcible rape, once a misdemeanor, became a felony pun-
ishable by "judgement of life and member." Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I,
c. 34 (1285); 1E Coke, The Second Part of the Institute of the Laws of England 432
(1797). This new provision did not specifically reference the crime of non-forcible
rape of a child. Therefore, some question exists as to whether this more severe
penalty would have applied to that crime. See Charles A. Phipps, Children,
Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In Search of Reason, 22 Seton Hall Legis. J. 1, 9
(1997).
110. See 1E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institute of the Laws of England 181
(1797).
111. See Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13 (1275); 1E. Coke, The Second
Part of the Institute of the Laws of England 179 (1797).
112. See 4 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 212 (1769).
113. See id. (citing 18 Eliza. c. 7 (1576)); Sir Edward Coke, The Third Institute
of the Laws of England 60 (4th ed. London 1669). Apparently, this law was the
result of some confusion as to whether the crime of rape encompassed sexual inter-
20001 PROTECTIVE CRUELTY 513
Of course, at common law, a crime always consisted not only of
a forbidden act, but a mens rea, a guilty intent. As a natural exten-
sion, by 1639, the English courts were accepting a reasonable and
honest mistake as to the facts surrounding one's conduct as a de-
fense to criminal conduct. 114 The issue of whether mistake as to
age was permitted as a defense apparently never arose until the
19th century. 115 Perhaps this was due in part to the fact that the
age of consent was drawn so low under these statutes. In any
event, the early English courts never imposed strict liability as to
age for these crimes.
However, during the later 19th century, there was a resur-
gence of interest in the statutory rape laws. This interest has been
given various historical interpretations, such as the beginnings of
today's continuing struggle to liberate women from sexual ex-
ploitation," 6 the seeds of today's laws protecting children against
sexual abuse, 1 7 or as a characteristically Victorian effort attempt
to impose a moral standard on society, particularly aimed at the
course against young children. In 1571, a case was tried at the Queen's Bench, in
which the court held that the rape of seven-year-old child was held to be no offense:
"if she had been nine years or more, it would have been otherwise." Mortimer
Levine, A More than Ordinary Case of "Rape," 13 and 14 Elizabeth 1, 7 Am. J.
Legal History 159, 162 (1963). Levine postulates that this decision rested on the
justice's belief that rape was not possible in so young a female because procreation
was not possible, or, alternately, suggests that the court was simply dismissing a
bad indictment. As noted, it was far from clear whether Westminster II-the stat-
ute which made rape a felony-applied to non-forcible intercourse of an underage
female. If it indeed was not, then the only applicable statute would have been
Westminster I, a misdemeanor. Therefore, the indictment for having "feloniously
ravished" the victim would have been fatally flawed. See Levine, supra, at 163. On
the other hand, this view has been criticized as mere speculation because the court
did not provide its reasoning. See Phipps, supra note 109, at 10 & nn. 31-33. In
any case, it appears that the Statute of Elizabeth was a direct outcome of the 1571
case. See id. at 9 & n.31 (citing Sir Edward Coke, The Third Institute of the Laws
of England 60 (4th ed. London 1669)).
114. See Levitt's Case, reported in Cook's Case, Cro. Car. 537, 538, 79 Eng.
Rep. 1063, 1064 (K.B. 1639).
115. See Myers, supra note 19, at 111.
116. See Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn at Last"." Rape Reform in
Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 14-18, 30 (1997) (argu-
ing, after an analysis of writings of the Women's Christian Temperance Union,
that the Union's focus on abuse of young females was in fact intended to correct a
double standard of morality. Also, the effort represented a backdoor attempt at
reform of forcible rape laws generally, which at the time failed to cover a number of
coercive situations and allowed a very broad defense of consent.).
117. See id. at 32-33 (noting the child welfare movement's interest in the statu-
tory rape laws).
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protection of "pure" womanhood. 118 As a result of this movement,
many states raised their ages of consent to intercourse until late
adolescence or adulthood. 119 Thus, the stage was set for mistakes
of age to be made.
Further complicating matters was the fact that roughly
around the period that the age of consent was being raised, the
function of mens rea in criminal law was being undermined by the
creation of new strict-liability crimes. During the 19th century,
criminal laws were enacted not simply to punish traditional com-
mon-law crimes such as murder, rape, or theft. Instead, criminal
laws were being enacted to address the social ills brought about by
industrialization and urbanization, such as the sale of impure food
and intoxicants, lack of sanitation, traffic, unsafe working condi-
tions, unsound building construction, nuisances, and also moral of-
fenses.' 20 These statutes did not involve serious penalties.121
Furthermore, since the vast number of these statutes would clog
the criminal courts, there was a need for summary adjudication. 122
Therefore, this new type of criminal statutes, which came to be
known as "public welfare offenses," did not require a mens rea, and
imposed strict criminal liability. 123
118. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern
Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 15, 25-26 (1994) (arguing the
fact that ultimately, many states' refusal to allow a mistake of fact as to age de-
fense, while permitting a defense based upon the promiscuity of the victim, demon-
strates that the purpose of the statutory rape laws ultimately was for the
protection of "pure" girls). See also Larson, supra note 116, at 62-64 (conceding
that as finally enacted and judicially construed, the statutory rape laws, with their
allowing for a promiscuity defense, ultimately failed in their mission to eradicate a
moral double standard).
119. See Larson, supra note 116, at 2-3.
120. See Bowes Sayre, supra note 91, at 68-69. But see Richard G. Singer, The
Resurgence of Mens Rea: III-The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30
B.C. L. Rev. 337, 341-374 (1989) (arguing that Bowes Sayre overestimates the ex-
tent to which strict liability was designed to protect the public welfare, as well as
the extent to which the entire notion of strict criminal liability was accepted by the
English and American courts).
121. See Bowes Sayre, supra note 120, at 68-69.
122. See id.
123. See id. For the Rhode Island cases, see State v. Smith, 10 R.I. 258, 261
(1872) (upholding conviction under statutes forbidding the sale of adulterated
milk, despite the fact that the defendant had no knowledge of the adulteration);
State v. Melville, 11 R.I. 417, 418 (1877) (upholding conviction under statute for-
bidding the dealing or banking for a faro game, even if "innocently" dealt); State v.
Hughes, 16 A. 911, 913 (R.L 1889) (upholding a conviction for maintaining a com-
mon nuisance, i.e., a "building, place, or tenement used for the illegal sale and
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The 19th century legislatures were silent as to whether statu-
tory rape statutes were to be included among the strict liability
crimes. Instead, it was the 19th century courts that made that
leap.124 This imposition of strict liability appears to have begun
with the 1875 English case, Regina v. Prince.125 In that case, the
defendant, Henry Prince, had been convicted of the crime of taking
"an unmarried girl, being under the age of sixteen years, out of the
possession and against the will of her father." 26 The girl involved,
Annie Phillips, was fourteen years of age, but "looked very much
older than sixteen," and had told Prince that she was eighteen.' 27
This abduction statute, too, was silent as to whether or not strict
liability was to be imposed as to the age of the girl in question. The
Prince court, however, rejected Prince's argument that there could
be no offense without his actual knowledge as to Annie Phillips'
age. Instead, the Prince court imposed strict liability as to age
based upon its belief that strict liability was necessary in order to
protect young women:
... we are of the opinion that the intention of the legislature
sufficiently appears to have been to punish the abduction, un-
less the girl, in fact, was of such an age as to make her con-
sent an excuse, irrespective of whether he knew her to be too
young to give an effectual consent, and to fix that age at
sixteen.128
keeping of intoxicating liquors," despite lack of jury instruction that defendant
must be found to know that the liquor being sold there was intoxicating).
124. See Myers, supra note 19, at 111-12.
125. See id. at 110 (citing Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875)).
126. Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 155 (1875) (Brett, J.,
dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 171. The Prince court arrived at its conclusion about the legislative
intent by examining the other sections of the statute, which forbade the unlawful
carnal knowledge and abuse of girls between ten and twelve, and under ten years
old. See id. at 171-72. The Prince court noted that these sections, too, had no
mental element. See id. The Prince court assumed that no defense of mistake was
permitted for these crimes: "It would produce the monstrous result that a man who
had carnal connection with a girl, in reality not quite ten years old, but whom he
on reasonable grounds believed to be a little more than ten, was to escape alto-
gether." Id. Therefore, the Prince court inferred from this that Parliament's si-
lence as to the defendant's knowledge of the girl's age in the abduction statute
similarly constituted a deliberate denial of the defense. However, the Prince court
cited no authority for the proposition that these statutory rape provisions - them-
selves the embodiments of Westminster I and the Statute of Elizabeth - imposed
strict liability as to age.
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Additionally, one of the concurring opinions held that Prince's
conviction should rest on the "moral wrong" theory-that is, Prince
should be held strictly liable because when he took the girl out of
the possession of her father, he had intended to commit an act that
was morally wrong, even if it were not criminally punished:
... the question is, whether we are bound to construe the
statute as though they [the words "not believing her to be
over the age of sixteen) were, on account of the rule that the
mens rea is necessary to make an act a crime. I am of the
opinion that we are not, nor as though the word "knowingly"
was there, and for the following reasons: The act forbidden is
wrong in itself, if without lawful cause; I do not say illegal,
but wrong.129
Alternately, the same concurrence also suggested a "lesser
legal wrong" theory for Prince's culpability, since Prince had com-
mitted a legal wrong against Annie Phillips' father by depriving
him of his right to his possession of her. Prince, the concurrence
reasoned, knew that he had interfered with that right to posses-
sion. Therefore, Prince must accept all legal consequences flowing
from that original wrong act, including those stemming from the
fact that she proved to be under sixteen:
But what the statute contemplates, and what I say is wrong,
is the taking of a female of such tender years that she is prop-
erly called a girl, can be said to be in another's possession,
and in that other's care or charge. The legislature has en-
acted that if anyone does this wrong act, he does it at the risk
of her turning out to be under sixteen .... If the taker be-
lieved he had the father's consent, though wrongly, he would
have no mens rea; so if he did not know she was in anyone's
possession, nor in the care or charge of anyone. In those
cases he would not know he was doing the act forbidden by
the statute-an act which, if he knew she was in possession
and in care or charge of anyone, he would know was a crime
or not, according as she was under sixteen or not. He would
not know he was doing an act wrong in itself, whatever was
his intention, if done without lawful cause. 130
In America, the Prince holding was applied to statutory rape
as well. 131 Some American courts would apply Prince's rationale
129. Id. at 174 (Bramwell, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 175.
131. See Myers, supra note 19, at 111.
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that strict liability as to age was absolutely indispensable to the
fulfillment of the statutory goal of protecting young females from
exploitation from predatory males, however reasonable the defend-
ant's mistake may have been. 132 Other courts would apply the
Prince concurrence's "moral wrong" or "lesser legal wrong" the-
ory-the other "moral" or "legal" wrong being fornication-and
thus conclude that because the defendant had intended to engage
in the moral or legal wrong of fornication, he could be held crimi-
nally liable for statutory rape.' 33
However enthusiastically the American courts followed Prince
and imposed strict liability as to age, their legal reasoning was
often erroneous. The issue in Prince was mistake of age as to ab-
duction; there would be no English case rejecting reasonable mis-
take of age as to statutory rape.' 34 In fact, ten years after Prince,
Parliament amended the statutes in order to permit the defense of
reasonable mistake as to age for the crime of "defilement of a girl
between thirteen and eighteen." 35 Therefore, the precedential
value of Prince was severely weakened. Furthermore, in some
cases, these American decisions find support for imposing strict li-
ability for statutory rape in the existence of strict liability public
132. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 79 So. 314, 315 (Ala. Ct. App. 1918)
If into this statute should be injected the knowledge of the age of the girl,
or if the fact of her appearance would indicate she is more than 16, will
justify the defendant in the commission of the offense, in many instances
the very purpose of the statute would be thwarted, for it is a matter of
universal common knowledge that many girls under the age of 16 are
more precocious and more fully developed than are those of 16 and even
17 years of age, and it is manifest that these are the very girls, those who
are more mature in appearance, whom the statute is intended to protect,
and who most need the protection of this statute.
People v. Marks, 130 N.Y.S. 524 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911); Zent v. State, 3 Ohio App.
473 (1914).
133. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murphy, 42 N.E. 504, 505 (Mass. 1896)
The defendants in the present cases knew that they were violating the
law. Their intended crime was fornication, at the least. It is a familiar
rule that, if one intentionally commits a crime, he is responsible crimi-
nally for the consequences of his act, if the offense proves to be different
from that which he intended.
Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Crown Cas. 154, 175 (1875). See also Edens v. State, 43
S.W. 89, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897) (quoting Bish. St. Crimes, § 490: "His intent to
violate the laws or morality and the good order of society, though with the consent
of the girl, and though in a case where he supposes he shall escape punishment,
satisfies the demands of the law, and he must take the consequences.").
134. See Myers, supra note 19, at 110-11.
135. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 69, §§ 5 (1)-(2).
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welfare offenses, thus demonstrating a failure to appreciate the
difference between a petty public welfare offense and a serious,
common-law crime such as rape. 136 Despite these weaknesses,
however, until 1964, Prince and its progeny managed to dominate
American jurisprudence on this issue, to the point where it was
generally understood that no defense of mistake as to the com-
plainant's age would be allowed to statutory rape in any jurisdic-
tion, regardless of the honesty and reasonableness of the mistake,
or the level of care which the defendant might have taken to dis-
cover the complainant's true age. 137
B. Modern Views on Strict Liability as to Age in Statutory Rape
and Child Molestation
During the latter half of this century, the uniform imposition
of strict liability as to age in statutory rape/child molestation has
shown distinct signs of crumbling. The emerging rule followed by
a number of jurisdictions is to allow the defense of mistake as to
age, usually based upon a judgment as to when a mistake as to a
complainant's age might be reasonable.
In part, the new reluctance to impose strict liability as to the
age of a complainant springs from changing sexual mores. Cur-
rently, courts now recognize that the doctrines of "moral wrong,"
as applied to statutory rape, have been seriously undercut for the
simple reason that sexual mores are in a state of flux.' 38 Given
this wide-spread debate on a sexual moral code, attempts to im-
pose strict liability as to age on the strength of the "moral wrong"
theory are questionable at best.139 Furthermore, fornication stat-
136. See Murphy, 42 N.E. at 505 (noting that strict liability for statutory rape
was justified because strict liability had been imposed for other crimes, such as
"the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, for selling adulterated milk, for unlaw-
fully selling naptha, for admitting a minor to a billiard room, and the like.").
137. See Myers, supra note 19, at 105-06 & nn. 3-11.
138. See, e.g., State v. Garnett, 632 A.2d 797, 802 (Md. 1993).
139. See Model Penal Code § 213.6, cmt. at 414 (1980); LaFave & Scott, supra
note 16, at 583. The Rhode Island General Assembly itself appears to have recog-
nized the weakness of resting on community standards of morality in a criminal
statute when revising the sexual assault statutes. In 1972, in State v. Beaulieu,
290 A.2d 850 (1972), the Rhode Island Supreme Court refused to find that the
former R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 (1956) (1969 Reenactment) ("Indecent assault on
child") contained an implied intent to "gratify sexual desires or to frighten the
child;" the simple fact that community standards would find the assault "immod-
est, immoral, and improper" was sufficient to support a conviction. Beaulieu, 290
A.2d at 854. Since Beaulieu, the Rhode Island General Assembly changed the
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utes-including Rhode Island's-have been repealed, 140 go largely
unenforced, 141 and may still be debatable on constitutional
grounds. 142 Thus, even some modem courts imposing the defense
acknowledge that the "lesser legal wrong" rationale for imposing
strict liability as to age has also become a virtual dead letter.143
Of course, nowadays, there still remains the issue of whether
strict liability is necessary to fulfill the protective function of the
statutory rape statutes-which by now cover both males and fe-
males. Even this rationale, however, has been undermined by a
general reaction against strict criminal liability generally. The
drafters of the Model Penal Code, among others, strongly criticize
the use of strict criminal liability for serious crimes as having an
unduly harsh result, and also as lacking in any justification in
terms of deterrence.144 The debate upon the appropriateness of
imposing strict liability for serious crimes has even taken on a con-
stitutional dimension. As the United States Supreme Court has
declared, mens rea is "the rule of, rather than the exception to, the
mens rea required for crimes requiring sexual contact, to "the intentional touching
of the victim's or accused's intimate parts, clothed or unclothed, if that intentional
touching can be reasonably construed as intended by the accused to be for the pur-
pose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault." R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1 (1956)
(1994 Reenactment & Supp. 1999).
140. Rhode Island repealed its own fornication and incest statutes in 1989. See
1989 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 214, § 1.
141. See State v. Silva, 491 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Haw. 1971) (Levinson, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing majority's reliance upon lesser legal wrong theory where no prose-
cutions for fornication had taken place in at least the past 4 years). But see Robert
Misner, Minimalism, Desuetude, and Fornication, 35 Willamette L. Rev. 1, 6-13
(1999) (describing Idaho's recent campaign to eliminate teenage pregnancy by
bringing fornication charges against teenage mothers and the fathers of their
children).
142. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring Connecticut's
statute forbidding the use of contraception to be unconstitutional as applied to
married persons); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (declaring Massachu-
setts' law against distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons to be uncon-
stitutional); Carey v. Population Services Inter., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking
down New York laws against distribution of contraceptives to minors as unconsti-
tutional, despite arguments that the law was intended to protect the morality of
the young). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to invali-
date Georgia's anti-sodomy statute, declaring that there was no fundamental right
for homosexuals to engage in sodomy).
143. See Garnett, 632 A.2d at 802.
144. See Model Penal Code, § 2.05 cmt.1 at 282-83 (1985); LaFave & Scott,
supra note 16, at 348-351; Herbert Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court,
Supreme Court Rev. 107, 109 (1962); Singer, supra note 120, at 403-407.
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principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." 145 Given
this long tradition of a mens rea requirement, it could be argued
that the imposition of strict liability as to age in statutory rape "
offends [a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."146 The
United States Supreme Court has in fact suggested that in some
cases, strict criminal liability may violate due process. 147 How-
ever, the United Supreme Supreme Court has also failed to
delineate those circumstances under which strict criminal liabil-
ity may violate due process.148 Therefore, constitutional
145. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
146. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
147. See, eg., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (striking down a
conviction under the felon registration requirement, especially where her suppos-
edly criminal conduct involved mere presence in the city, where appellant had no
way of knowing of the registration requirement or having reason to inquire as to
such requirements); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 156 (1959) (refusing to up-
hold California statute's imposition of strict liability as to knowledge of book's con-
tents as to bookseller charged with selling obscene materials). But see Montana v.
Egelhof, 518 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1996) (upholding Montana's statutory ban on refusal
of defense of voluntary intoxication); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968)
("The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, justification, and duress have
historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension
between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, phil-
osophical and medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has
always been thought to be the province of the States."); United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 250-51 (1922) (permitting strict liability in drug sale laws).
148. See Packer, supra note 144, at 107 ("To paraphrase: Mens rea is an impor-
tant requirement, but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes.").
See also Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The
Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 859, 904
(1999) (agreeing that the constitutional status of mens rea remains ambiguous).
The issue of whether strict liability may be constitutionally imposed for statu-
tory rape may intersect with the issue of whether there is any fundamental right
for adults to engage in consensual sexual relationships without state interference.
See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 828 (1999).
Michaels argues that the unifying principle-albeit a poorly articulated unifying
principle-of the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings on strict liability may be that strict
liability may not be imposed where another constitutional right is involved. See id.
at 829. Recently, however, the notion of the idea that there is a constitutional
right to be free from state interference in sexual matters has been seriously weak-
ened by the Supreme Court's ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
wherein the Court refused to invalidate Georgia's anti-sodomy statute, declaring
that there was no fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Under
this analysis, then, the imposition of strict liability as to age in statutory rape may
pass constitutional muster. See Michaels, supra, at 893-94.
Some defendants have in fact attempted to argue that that the imposition of
strict liability as to age, which forces one to accept criminal penalties if one's part-
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challenges to strict liability in statutory rape laws rarely
succeed. 149
However, successful judicial challenges have been brought to
the imposition of strict liability in statutory rape laws where the
challenge was couched in a statutory interpretation argument. Ul-
timately, the first United States case allowing the defense of rea-
sonable mistake as to age, the California Supreme Court's 1964
decision in People v. Hernandez, did in fact rest upon statutory in-
terpretation principles. 150 The Hernandez court began its analysis
ner proved to be underaged, unacceptably impinges upon the freedom to engage in
sexual relationships. However, even before Bowers, these arguments failed. See
Nelson v. Moriarty, 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 1973) (holding that cases on re-
productive rights did create right to engage in sexual relationships; strict liability
as to age unconstitutional); Goodrow v. Perrin, 403 A.2d 864, 865-66 (N.H. 1979)
(noting that even if there was a fundamental right to personal decisions in sexual
matters, there was still a compelling state interest in protecting youth and
children).
149. See Nelson, 484 F.2d at 1035; United States v. Brooks, 841 F.2d 268, 269
(9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1991); State
v. Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Iowa 1981); Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43 (Md.
1999) (Eldridge, J., concurring in result only) (Bell, C.J., & Cathell, J., dissenting);
Veasey v. State, 507 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Commonwealth v. Miller,
432 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Mass. 1982) (reaffirming Commonwealth v. Moore, 269
N.E.2d 636 (Mass. 1971) in asserting that strict criminal liability as to age of com-
plainant is not necessarily a denial of due process)); People v. Cash, 351 N.W.2d
822, 828 (Mich. 1984); Goodrow v. Perrin, 403 A.2d 864, 866-67 (N.H. 1979) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting); State v. Navarette, 376 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Neb. 1985). But see State
v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 838-39 (Alaska 1978) (holding that under the Alaska con-
stitution, it would be a violation of due process to convict a person of the serious
crime of statutory rape (defined as intercourse with a person less than 19 years of
age) without permitting defense of reasonable mistake as to age); State v.
Fremgen, 889 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995), af/d 914 P.2d 1244 (Alaska
1996) (holding that statutory denial of defense of reasonable mistake as to age for
the crime of sexual abuse of a minor (defined as intercourse with a person less than
13 years of age) violated due process provisions of Alaska constitution)).
Although no Rhode Island constitutional argument appears to have been
made in this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court on repeated occasions has in-
terpreted the state constitution to provide protections beyond those contained in
the federal constitution. See, eg., State v. Pimental, 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1981)
(refusing to interpret Art. I., Sec. 6 of the Declaration of Rights to permit drunk-
driving roadblocks, despite federal authority interpreting the Fourth Amendment
to allow them); In re Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 278 A.2d 852 (R.I. 1971)
(requiring 12-person criminal jury under Art. I. Secs. 10 and 15, although U.S.
Supreme Court had held that a 6-person jury was acceptable under the Sixth and
Seventh Amendments). No Rhode Island case, however, answers the question of
whether Article I, Section 10 of the Declaration of Rights might require mens rea
for serious crimes.
150. See People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
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by noting that California's criminal code's requirement of a "union,
or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence" to con-
stitute commission of crime, and also provided that one was not
capable of committing a crime if one acted "under an ignorance or
mistake of fact which disapproves any criminal intent."151 The
Hernandez court acknowledged that strict liability had been held
to be permissible in some instances despite that requirement. 152
However, the Hernandez court also observed that more recently it
had not imposed strict liability unless the legislature had, by im-
plication or otherwise, expressed an intent or policy to be served by
imposing strict liability. 153 The Hernandez court noted that no in-
tent to impose strict liability was ever expressed by the legislature.
Instead, strict liability had originally been judicially imposed in its
earlier decision of People v. Ratz,154 which rested partially on the
discredited Regina v. Prince.155
The Hernandez court then proceeded to analyze the continued
justification for imposing strict liability as a protective measure.
The Hernandez court observed that its earlier decision in Ratz in-
volved a child under the age of fourteen. 156 However, the Her-
nandez court noted, the harsh measure of strict liability was far
less justified when the law was attempting to protect an older teen-
ager. Given a complainant had achieved an age and level of ma-
turity that a reasonable mistake as to her age was possible, and
the defendant in fact was honestly misled, the defendant in having
sex with her had in fact shown no intent to abuse a child, and
therefore the imposition of strict liability was ultimately illogi-
cal. 15 7 In any case, the Hernandez court observed, an older teen-
151. Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 675.
152. See id.
153. See id. (citing People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850 (Cal. 1956) (reconsidering ear-
lier holdings on strict liability for bigamy)).
154. People v. Ratz, 46 P. 915, 916 (Cal. 1896).
155. Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875).
156. Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 677.
157. See id. at 676 & n. 3 (quoting Morris Ploscowe, Sex and the Law, 184-85
(1951).
When the law declares that sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of
ten years is rape, it is not illogical to refuse to give any credence to the
defense, 'J thought she was older, and I therefore did not believe that I
was committing a crime when I had sexual intercourse with her' .... But
when age limits are raised to sixteen, eighteen, and twenty-one, when the
young girl becomes a young woman, when adolescent boys as well as
young men are attracted to her, the sexual act begins to lose its quality of
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ager was in less need of protection, for she might well have
attained some level of physical, social, and sexual maturity, there-
fore would be far more capable of dealing with the possible compli-
cations of a sexual relationship. 158
Since Hernandez, a substantial number of jurisdictions have
modified their views on strict liability as to age. It is true that as
referenced in the Yanez majority's opinion, only a few other courts
have interpreted their jurisdictions' statutory rape statutes to al-
low the defense of reasonable mistake of age. 159 Other courts do
continue to read strict liability into their silent statutory rape and
child molestation statutes. Some of those decisions do have some
basis for the conclusion that the legislature intended to deny the
defense, for there is legislative history suggesting that the defense
had been considered and rejected. 160 On the other hand, some ju-
risdictions have rested upon the theory of "legislative ratifica-
tion"-that is, the presumption that the legislature is aware of an
earlier precedent denying the defense, and accepts the court's view
when it redrafts or reenacts the statute without providing for the
defense. 161 However, this interpretation is open to criticism where
the precedents in question rested on the discredited "moral wrong"
abnormality and physical danger to the victim. Bona fide mistakes in the
age of girls can be made by men and boys who are no more dangerous
than others of their social, economic and educational level .... Even if
the girl looks to be much older than the age of consent fixed by the statute,
even if she lies to the man concerning her age, if she is a day below the
statutory age sexual intercourse with her is rape. The man or boy who
has intercourse with such girl still acts at his peril. The statute is inter-
preted as if it were protecting children under the age of ten.
Id. (omissions in original).
158. See id. at 674.
159. See discussion at Section IB, supra.
160. See, e.g., State v. Buch, 926 P.2d 599, 606 (Haw. 1996) (Levinson, J. &
Klien, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Garnett, 632 A.2d
797, 804 (Md. 1993) (Eldridge, J. & Bell, J., filing separate dissents); State v. Vas-
quez, 622 S.W.2d 864, 865-66 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1981); State v. Searles, 621 A.2d
1281, 1283 (Vt. 1993). State v. Stiffier, 788 P.2d 220, 225 (Idaho 1990) (Boyle, J.,
specially concurring) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring) (Bistline, J., dissenting)
(relying in part on the fact that the Idaho legislature had briefly enacted, then
repealed, the Model Penal Code, which would have allowed the defense). See also
State v. Plude, 621 A.2d 1342, 1346 (Conn. 1993) (observing that the legislature
had since repealed the statute containing provisions for mistake of age for provi-
sions regarding intercourse for a person under the age of 16).
161. See also People v. Cash, 351 N.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Mich. 1984) (Kavanagh,
J., dissenting) (relying upon earlier opinion in People u. Gengels, 188 N.W. 398
(Mich. 1922), but analyzing the continuing viability of Gengels).
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or "lesser legal wrong" theory. 162 Many jurisdictions simply reject
the defense without any analysis as to the ultimate intent of the
legislature. 163 Still, other jurisdictions have yet to revisit this is-
sue since Hernandez.'6
While the judicial response may have been slow, and in many
cases, analytically weak, a number of legislatures have changed
their laws to clarify the circumstances under which the defense of
reasonable mistake as to age will be allowed. A minority of juris-
dictions have specifically denied the defense as to all complain-
ants. 165 However, far more have amended their statutes to permit
162. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 N.E.2d 463, 465 (Mass. 1982). See
also State v. Oar, 924 P.2d 599, 601 (Idaho 1996) (Johnson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (Trout, J., concurring in part and concurring in result) and
State v. Stiffler, 788 P.2d 220, 225 (Idaho 1990) (Boyle, J., specially concurring)
(McDevitt, J., specially concurring) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (assuming that the
legislature relied upon dicta in State v. Suennen, 209 P. 1072 (Idaho 1922) and
State v. Herr, 554 P.2d 961 (Idaho 1976)). Interestingly enough, the Idaho
Supreme Court denied the defense despite a statute regarding intent like Califor-
nia's. Nevada, as well, in State v. Jenkins, 877 P.2d 1063, 877 (Nev. 1994), also
refused the defense despite a similar intent statute.
163. See, eg., State v. Fulks, 160 N.W.2d 418, 419 (S.D. 1968), overturned on
other grounds; State v. Ree, 331 N.W.2d 557 (S.D. 1983). Iowa, in State v. Tague,
310 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1981), merely rested upon earlier holdings in State v.
Sherman, 77 N.W. 461, 462 (Iowa 1898) and State v. Newton, 44 Iowa 45, 47
(1876)). Mississippi merely relied upon the "majority" view that strict liability was
to be imposed. See State v. Collins, 691 So.2d 918, 923 (Miss. 1997) (relying on
mere "majority" view that strict liability was to be imposed as to age in interpret-
ing its own statute). Similarly, Nebraska assumed that its own statute followed
the "majority" view in State v. Vicars, 183 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Neb. 1971), and has
followed it since. See State v. Navarette, 376 N.W. 8, 11 (Neb. 1985) (following
Vicars); State v. Campbell, 473 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Neb. 1991) (following Navarette).
See also Veasey v. State, 507 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. Ct. App.) (1998) (relying upon
dicta in Tant v. State, 281 S.E.2d 357, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981), a kidnapping case).
164. For example, Alabama has not examined the issue since Miller v. State, 79
So. 314 (Ala. Ct. App. 1918), nor North Carolina since State v. Wade, 32 S.E.2d 314
(N.C. 1944), nor Oklahoma since State v. Reid, 290 P.2d 775 (Crim. Ct. App. Ok.
1955), nor Virginia since Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. 30 Gratt. 845 (Va.
1878).
165. See D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4111 (1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.021 (West
1992); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2c:14-5 (West 1995) (forbidding mistake of age defense in
all sex crimes). See also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:80 (West 1997) (defense of lack of
knowledge as defense to carnal knowledge of a juvenile, defined as when a person
over age of 17 had intercourse with person over 12, but under 17); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 14:42. (West 1997) (forbidding defense of lack of knowledge as to age for
aggravated rape, defined as intercourse with person under 12). See also N.Y. Pe-
nal Law § 15.20 (McKinney 1998); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.23 (West 1996); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 939.43 (West 1996) (denying mistake as to age for any crime unless speci-
fied); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 762 (1995 & 1998 Supp.); People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d
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the defense. At least two legislatures permit the defense without
limitation as to the complainant's age. 166 Many other legislatures
allowed the defense once the potential complainant has reached a
particular age.167
52, 57 (Cal. 1984) (refusing to extend People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal.
1964) to permit a defense of reasonable mistake as to age for charge of lewd and
lascivious conduct with person under 14, relying in part on statutory provision
denying probation or suspension of sentence for the offense unless defendant hon-
estly or reasonably believed that complainant was 14 or over).
166. See Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-42-4-3, 35-42-4-9 (West 1998 & 1999 Supp.) (al-
lowing defense if the defendant reasonably believed the child to be 16 years or
older); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510-030 (Michie 1990) (permitting defendant to prove
in exculpation the lack of knowledge as to age).
167. See 18 U.S.C. §2243 (1994) (permitting defense for sexual abuse of a minor
between 12 and 16, where defendant can establish by a preponderance of evidence
that he reasonably believed complainant was 16 years of age); 18 U.S.C. § 2241
(1994) (no defense where child under 12). See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1407
(West 1989 & 1999 Supp.) (permitting defense where criminality depends upon
complainant's being 15, 16, or 17 years of age, if defendant did not and could not
have reasonably known age); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (Michie 1997 & 1999
Supp.) (permitting defense where criminality depends upon complainant's being a
critical age older than 14 years and defendant reasonably believed child to be of
critical age or above. Defendant may be guilty of lesser offense defined by the age
he reasonably believed child to be.); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-406 (West 1999)
(permitting defense where criminality depends upon complainant's being below
age of 18 and child was at least fifteen years of age, and defendant reasonably
believed child to be 18 or older; no defense of lack of knowledge or reasonable belief
where criminality depends on complainant's being below age of 15); Il. Comp.
Stat. ch. 720 § 5/12-17(b) (West 1993 & 1999 Supp.) (defense available for offenses
where complainant is between 13 and 17 if defendant reasonably believes the vic-
tim is 17 years of age); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17-A § 254 (West 1983 & 1999
Supp.) (permitting defense where complainant is over 14); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§§ 609-344 (West 1987 & 1999 Supp.) (permitting defense where complainant is at
least 13 years of age, and defendant can prove his mistake by a preponderance of
evidence); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.020 (West 1999) (allowing defense where criminal-
ity depends upon child being under 17 if defendant reasonably believed child was
17 or over, but forbidding defense where criminality depends upon child being 13
years of age or younger); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-511 (1999) (permitting defense
where criminality depends upon complainant's being less than 16 and defendant
reasonably believed child to be older. Such belief will not be considered reasonable
if complainant is less than 14); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-01.1 (1997) (permitting
defense where criminality depends upon complainant being a minor and actor rea-
sonably believed complainant to be an adult; denying defense where criminality
depends upon complainant's being below age of 15, and defendant did not know
age or reasonably believed complainant to be over 14.); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 2907.02, 2907.04 (Banks-Baldwin 1997 & 1999 Supp.) (requiring that defendant
know that child is between 13 and 16, or is reckless in that regard; no defense
where child is under 13); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.325 (1990) (forbidding defense
where the criminality of conduct depends upon child being under 16 but allowing
defense where criminality depends upon child's being under a specified age other
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In short, the Yanez's majority's position that strict liability as
to age is an entrenched view is clearly called into question.
Although once strict criminal liability as to age briefly dominated
American jurisprudence, that position is in the process of being re-
versed. Given the statutory and judicial developments over the
years, it appears that the view that strict liability is necessary to
protect children and youths has been considerably modified since
Prince, particularly where, as in Yanez, the complainant has
reached adolescence. Since more and more jurisdictions take the
view that strict liability is not necessary for adolescents, the Yanez
majority's assumption that the General Assembly deliberately in-
tended to impose strict liability as to age in order to protect youths
is seriously undermined.
IV. STRICT LIABILITY IN STATE V. YANEZ
The Yanez majority asserted a two-pronged argument for its
denial of the defense of reasonable mistake as to age in the statu-
tory rape/child molestation statute. 168 The Court argues that the
General Assembly's silence as to whether or not the reasonable
mistake of age would be permitted was deliberate, intended to
than 16 and the defendant reasonably believed child to be above the specified age);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 3102 (West 1983 & 1999 Supp.) (permitting defense where
criminality depends on complainant's being below a critical age older than 14
years, if he can prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she reasonably
believed that child was above critical age; no defense as to belief as to age where
criminality depends upon complainant's being below 14); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 9A.44.030 (West 1998 & 2000 Supp.) (allowing defense where mistake is based
upon victim's representations provided the victim is over the age of 12, and defend-
ant can prove his mistake by preponderance of evidence); W. Va. Code § 61-8B-12
(1997) (allowing affirmative defense of lack of knowledge as to age, unless reckless
in failing to know of age, unless complainant is under 11 years or under); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-308 (Michie 1999) (permitting defense where criminality depends
upon complainant's being under 16 and actor reasonably believed complainant to
be older; no defense where criminality depends upon child being under 12 or 14);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304.5 (1999) (modifying State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah
1984) by forbidding use of reasonable mistake of age for all of those offenses except
unlawful sexual conduct with a 16 or 17 year old).
Statutory age limits as to use of the defense also fall under constitutional chal-
lenges. However, these are generally unsuccessful. See, eg., United States v. Ran-
som, 942 F.2d 775, 777-78 (10th Cir. 1991). But see State v. Fremgen, 889 P.2d
1083, 1085 (Alaska Ct. App., 1995), aft'd 914 P.2d 1244 (Alaska 1996) (holding that
statutory denial of defense of reasonable mistake as to age for the crime of sexual
abuse of a minor (defined as intercourse with a person less than 13 years of age)
violated due process provisions of Alaska constitution)).
168. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 764-67 (R.I. 1998).
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adopt the majority rule the reasonable mistake of age defense
would not be permitted in order to effectuate the protective pur-
poses of the statute. 169 Additionally, the court argues that its ear-
lier precedents demanding a mens rea for other elements of the
crime of child molestation should not be extended to demand a de-
fense of reasonable mistake of age. However, as we shall see, the
court bases its arguments on an extremely narrow reading of the
statutes and cases involved.
A. The Legislative Intent-The Direct Evidence
Unfortunately, little direct assistance is provided by our legis-
lature in determining whether the statutory rape and child moles-
tation statutes were ever intended to permit or deny a defense as
to reasonable mistake of age. At several points in its history,
Rhode Island made substantial revisions in the laws regarding
sexual crimes against youth and children. Initially, the Rhode Is-
land colonial government incorporated the Statute of Westminster
I into its criminal laws. 170 In common with many other jurisdic-
tions in the latter half of the 19th century, Rhode Island in 1889
enacted a prohibition of "carnal knowledge and abuse of girls
under the age of fourteen,"171 later raising the age of consent to
169. See id. at 765-66.
170. See Proceedings of the First General Assembly of "The Incorporation of
Providence Plantations," and The Code of Laws Adopted by That Assembly in
1647, reprinted in J. Cushing, The Earliest Acts and Laws of the Colony of Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations: 1647-1719, 26 (1977) ("Rape is forbidden by
this present Assembly throughout the whole colony, and we do hereby declare that
it is when a man through his vile and unbridled affection lyeth with or forceth a
woman against her will; like hereunto is the knowing of a maid carnally who is
under the age of ten years, though it be with her consent. The penalty we do de-
clare felony of death. See for confirmation 13 Ed. 1, 34."). See also Laws and Acts
of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations Made from the First Settlement in
1636 to 1705, reprinted in Cushing, supra, at 65 ("Rape. This Assembly strictly
Forbid the Same & we doe hereby decla [sic) that it is when a man through his wild
& unbridled affection eth w' & Forceth A woman against her will like unto him
the Knowing of a maid Carnally who is under the lost text] age of Years though it
b Her Consent The Penalty we declare to be the Felony of Death: 13 : Edw: I : 34:
18: 6."). See also Acts and Laws of His Majesties Colony of Rhode Island and Provi-
dence Plantations in America, reprinted in Cushing, supra, at 1647-1719, 142
("Sodomy, Buggery or Rape, punished with Death."). However, in the 1798 reen-
actment, the specific references to the statutory rape provisions contained in the
colonial statutes were dropped. See An Act to Reform the Penal Laws § 6, Public
Laws of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 585 (Jan. 1798).
171. See 1889 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 738, at 135-36.
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sixteen in 1894, where it remains to the present day.172 Later, in
the 1956 edition of the Rhode Island General Laws, Chapter 11-37
of the Rhode Island General Laws, entitled "Rape and Seduction,"
prohibited "common-law" rape and "carnal knowledge and abuse"
of a female under sixteen. 173 The statute would be amended to in-
clude "indecent assault" upon a child under the age of thirteen. 174
These statutes themselves did not contain definitions for any of the
prohibited acts and little case law existed to interpret them.
In 1979, the General Assembly repealed Chapter 11-37 and
substituted a newly revised chapter pertaining to sexual assault,
which, with some changes, remains in place to this day.175 This
statute classified sexual penetration of both males and females
under the age of thirteen as first degree sexual assault, and the
sexual penetration of persons under sixteen by persons over eight-
een as third degree sexual assault. 176 In 1984, the General Assem-
bly placed children under thirteen under the protection of the child
molestation statutes, which mandated harsher penalties. 177 In
1988, the General Assembly then raised the threshold age of the
child molestation statutes to fourteen. 78
At no point in the history of Rhode Island's sexual assault stat-
ute was the issue of mistake of age ever addressed. The statutes
themselves have always been silent. Nor does the limited legisla-
tive history maintained by the Rhode Island General Assembly
172. See 1894 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 1270, at 18-19.
173. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1 (1956) (1969 Reenactment).
174. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 (1956) (1969 Reenactment).
175. See 1979 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 302.
176. See id.
177. See 1984 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 59 §2.
178. See 1988 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 219 § 1. The history of how the threshold age
for the child molestation statutes came to be raised is somewhat interesting. On at
least two occasions, the state attempted to charge persons under the child molesta-
tion statutes where the children involved had passed their 13th birthdays. See
State v. Jordan, 528 A.2d 731 (R.I. 1987); State v. Collins, 543 A.2d 641 (R.I. 1988).
The Supreme Court rejected these attempts on two grounds. First, it had long
been understood that when a statute stated an upper threshold age, then it meant
exactly that age or younger. See Jordan, 528 A.2d at 733-34. Secondly, the child
molestation statutes had to be read harmoniously with the third degree sexual
assault statute, which prohibited sexual penetration of persons 13 to 16. If the
court allowed prosecutions for child molestation when the complainant had passed
his or her 13th birthday, then the state would have unfettered discretion to prose-
cute under either statute. See id. at 733-35. After the Jordan ruling, the House
Committee on Judiciary submitted the bill raising the threshold age at the request
of the Attorney General. See 88-H 9474 (1988).
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demonstrate any support for the idea that the defense was consid-
ered and rejected. A search of "dead bills" from 1956 to date-in-
cluding another bill considered by the 1979 General Assembly in
revising the sexual assault statute179-shows no consideration of
the issue by the General Assembly. Prior to the mid-1980's, de-
bates were not preserved in any form. Although some videotapes
of legislative sessions exist for 1988, the year the threshold age for
the child molestation statutes was raised to fourteen, there ap-
pears to have been no recorded discussion of the issue.
The Yanez majority, then, has no direct evidence as to the
General Assembly's intent to deny the defense of reasonable mis-
take as to age. Therefore, it attempts to rely upon a negative infer-
ence: the fact that the General Assembly made no provision for the
defense of reasonable mistake as to age in either the child molesta-
tion or third degree sexual assault, while specifying the intent nec-
essary for other types of sexual assault. 1 0 Initially, in 1979, when
the General Assembly revised the sexual assault statute, that stat-
ute punished "sexual penetration" under circumstances closely
paralleling the definition of common law rape,' 81 that is, where the
defendant engaged in such penetration using "force or coercion," or
"through concealment or by the element of surprise, is able to over-
come the victim," and where "the victim is thirteen years of age or
under."18 2 However, the General Assembly also engrafted on this
statute two new types of offenses that would not have constituted
rape at common law, that is, where the perpetrator "knows or has
reason to know that the victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally
disabled, or physically helpless," 83 or "engages in the medical
treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual
arousal, gratification, or stimulation."18 4 The Yanez majority con-
cludes that because the General Assembly provided a specific
mental element for these new offenses, the omission of a mental
intent in provisions for children under thirteen (later fourteen) was
deliberate, and designed to impose strict liability as to the age of
the complainant.18 5
179. See 79-H 5410 (1979).
180. See Jordan, 528 A.2d at 765-66.
181. See 1979 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 302.
182. State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1053 (R.I. 1983).
183. R.I. Pub. Laws 1979, ch. 302.
184. Id.
185. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 765-66.
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This reading is seriously flawed because the Yanez majority
fails to analyze the entire first degree sexual assault statute before
arriving at its conclusion.'8 6 The General Assembly, while provid-
ing a mental element for the new types of sexual assault, made no
specific provisions for any mental element for those sexual assaults
under circumstances that closely paralleled the definition of com-
mon-law rape.' 87 However, as the dissenting Justice Flanders ob-
serves, if we took the Yanez's majority's position that the failure to
provide a mental element equaled strict liability, we would be
forced to conclude that the General Assembly intended to impose
strict liability as to the forcible rape provisions contained in the
first degree sexual assault statute. However, forcible rape is still
considered a general intent crime.' 88 In fact, despite the legisla-
tive silence, the defense of mistake of fact as to consent has appar-
ently been permitted for forcible rape.' 8 9 Thus, the Yanez
majority's conclusion that silence equals an intent to impose strict
liability for underaged complainants is placed in serious doubt.
The Yanez majority might have drawn another possible infer-
ence about the legislative intent as to the defense of reasonable
mistake as to age. The General Assembly provided no mental ele-
ment where the complainant was under the age of thirteen, but did
provide such a mental element where the perpetrator "knows or
has reason to know" that the victim is mentally incapacitated or
disabled, or otherwise helpless. It could then be argued that the
General Assembly had intended that a reasonable mistake as to
the person's capacity to consent would be permitted where that in-
capacity was due to disability, but not where that incapacity was
due to age. Justice Flanders, however, presents another possible
reading: the specific intent elements discussed in both of the provi-
sions for new types of sexual assault were never intended to make
186. See id. at 779 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
187. See R.I. Pub. Laws 1979, ch. 302.
188. See State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 783 (R.I. 1996).
189. See State v. Martino, 642 A.2d 679 (R.I. 1994). This case involved an ap-
peal from a conviction of first degree sexual assault on the grounds that the jury
was not instructed on mistake of fact as to consent. The conviction was upheld not
because of a rejection of mistake of fact as to consent, but because the defendant
failed to preserve his objection to the instructions as given. See id. at 682. Fur-
thermore, questions that the jury had asked indicated that it had not convicted
even though the defendant may have made a reasonable mistake as to the com-
plainant's consent, but had actually found that the complainant had unequivocally
expressed her lack of consent. See id.
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any statement about strict liability as to age for underage com-
plainants. Instead, these new provisions should be read together,
as intending to carve out situations where the defense of consent
would not be available in cases of sexual assault of adults. 9 0
Justice Flanders' reading appears the more likely. It seems
logical that the General Assembly would have naturally been fo-
cusing on the mental elements necessary for the new types of as-
sault, while not having a reason to do so for older types of sexual
assault. Additionally, as Flanders points out, the General Assem-
bly would have taken greater care with the intent elements of the
statute not merely because they were new, but also to ensure that
they did not sweep too far beyond their protective purpose. 191 A
specific intent to gain sexual arousal would be quite desirable in
the medical examination provisions in order to avoid convictions
where the examiner's intention was innocent, but simply miscon-
strued. Similarly, particular care would be required when defining
the intent element for the crimes involving the physically or men-
tally disabled because the condition of the victim might not be de-
terminable by a layperson. 192 However, Flanders argues, since age
is a condition more readily assessed by a layperson, the General
Assembly would have had no cause to train its attention upon
age.' 93
Ultimately, Flanders' position appears to have been reinforced
by the later action of the 1984 General Assembly. At that time, the
General Assembly divorced the provisions regarding underage
complainants from the first degree sexual assault statute, and
placed them into the new first degree child molestation statute.194
With that legislation, the provisions regarding disabled adults and
the provisions regarding underaged persons were no longer placed
in the same category. Therefore, it is all the more debatable that
the provisions for children and the provisions for adults were in-
tended to be read together.
The Yanez majority advances another argument for imposing
strict criminal liability in the first degree child molestation statute
while distinguishing cases permitting the defense. The Yanez ma-
190. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 779 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See 1984 R.I. Pub.Laws ch. 59 § 2.
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jority distinguished the cases permitting the defense by arguing
that the complainants in Alaska's State v. Guest'95 and New Mex-
ico's Perez v. State196 were fifteen, and were therefore within a year
of age of consent in their states. On the other hand, the Yanez
majority argued, Allison was nearly fourteen. The Yanez majority,
then proceeds to compare the penalties for statutory rape and child
molestation, and attempts infer an intent that strict liability
should apply:
Unlike the circumstances in Guest and Perez in which the vic-
tims were fifteen, however, Allison was only thirteen years of
age. Furthermore, our Legislature has drawn distinctions
based upon the age of the victim. For example, § 11-37-8.2
provides a minimum penalty of twenty years in prison for the
sexual penetration of a person fourteen years of age or
younger, while § 11-37-7 prescribes a maximum penalty of
five years in prison for the sexual penetration of a person over
the age of fourteen but under the age of sixteen, provided that
the accused is over the age of eighteen. Compare § 11-37-8.2
with § § 11-37-6 and 11-37-7. We therefore conclude that
these two cases are also of no help to Yanez. 197
This argument fails. As we have observed, some states al-
lowing the defense do in fact have statutory schemes that make
similar distinctions based upon age, and allow the defense where
the complainant is in the higher age bracket.198 In such cases, of
course, the courts properly construe the omission of the defense
from the lower age bracket as a deliberate intent to deny the de-
fense. However, the provisions cited by the Yanez majority simply
define the defense and supply the punishment. There is no evi-
dence that the General Assembly has made any legislative judg-
ment at all as to whether the defense of mistake would be
permitted, much less drawing any line as to when the mistake of
age was permitted. 199 Therefore, the Yanez majority's inference
based upon these statutory provisions is weak.
195. 583 P.2d 836, 836 (Alaska 1978).
196. 803 P.2d 249, 250 (N.M. 1990).
197. Yanez, 716 A.2d at 764.
198. See note 167, supra.
199. The Perez Court, at least, appears to have been guided in its distinction
between the two age groups by former statutes that had specifically addressed the
issue of whether the defense would be allowed. See Perez, 803 P.2d at 251. Guest,
in fact, was followed by State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996),
which permitted the defense as to youths under 13.
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In short, the statutory analysis advanced by the Yanez major-
ity is inconclusive at best. Rather than establishing a deliberate
intent to create a strict liability crime for statutory rape/child mo-
lestation, the General Assembly's provisions for mental elements
for the new types of sexual assault seem at least as likely to have
been created as a matter of defining consent regarding adults.
When, as the dissent also points out, one considers that it is a well-
established canon of statutory interpretation that ambiguities in
the criminal statutes must be interpreted in favor of the defend-
ant,20 0 then the Yanez majority should have given Yanez the bene-
fit of the doubt inherent in the statutory silence.
B. The Implied Intent Doctrine in Rhode Island
The Yanez majority's textual analysis of the intent elements of
the sexual assault statutes is inconclusive for determining whether
or not the General Assembly intended to impose strict liability for
statutory rape and child molestation. Ultimately, all we are left
with is a statute that is silent as to the necessary intent elements.
In addition to misinterpreting the General Assembly's silence,
however, the Yanez majority also fails to fully analyze the question
of implied intent elements in Rhode Island criminal statutes. The
Yanez majority rejected California's Hernandez, as well as Utah's
Elton, because unlike California and Utah, the Rhode Island crimi-
nal code does not contain any provisions specifically requiring a
mental element for a crime and/or provisions requiring that strict
liability only be imposed when such a legislative intent was ex-
pressly stated.20 1 This easy dismissal of these cases overlooks the
fact that even in absence of a criminal code provision defining in-
tent, statutes that are silent or ambiguous as to the requisite
mental element have long been understood to require at least a
general criminal intent.20 2 In fact, prior to Yanez, when dealing
with other crimes-including child abuse-the Rhode Island
Supreme Court had established its reluctance to impose strict
criminal liability without clear instruction from the General
Assembly.
200. See State v. Beck, 43 A. 366, 368 (R.I. 1898); State v. Powers, 644 A.2d
828, 830-31 (R.I. 1994).
201. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 763.
202. See, eg., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 262 (1952).
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The Yanez majority places a great deal of weight upon a foot-
note in the United States Supreme Court case of Morissette v.
United States stating that: "sex offenses, such as rape, in which the
victim's actual age was determinative despite the defendant's rea-
sonable belief that the girl had reached the age of consent" were an
exception to the rule that a crime held an implied mens rea in-
tent.203 As Justice Flanders points out in his dissent, this observa-
tion was never intended as an ultimate holding on the validity of
interpreting statutory rape to be a strict liability crime. 20 4 Fur-
thermore, the Yanez majority's limited view of this case ignores the
larger lessons that Morissette teaches about statutory construc-
tion-lessons that the Rhode Island Supreme Court had appar-
ently also applied in the past.
Whatever the ultimate constitutional status of mens rea,205
Morissette established that when interpreting federal statutes, the
Court will not assume that silence equals a legislative intent to
impose strict liability as to a particular element of a crime.20 6 In
that case, the appellant took old bomb casings from an old govern-
ment bomb site, thinking that the casings had been abandoned. 20 7
He was then charged under 18 U.S.C. § 641, which punished any
person who "embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts"
government property to his use.208 At his trial, he was denied the
opportunity to present evidence that he had believed the casings
had been abandoned.20 9 On appeal, the government attempted to
argue that this denial was proper. The government pointed out
that Congress had provided the mental element of "knowingly" as
to the "conversion" portion of the statute.210 Therefore, the govern-
ment argued that the statute should be interpreted as requiring
only that the conversion must be done volitionally, but as imposing
strict liability as to the defendant's knowledge as to ownership of
the property.211
203. Yanez, 716 A.2d at 767 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
251 n.8 (1952)).
204. See id. at 776 n.17 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
205. See discussion at IIIB, supra.
206. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
207. See id at 247.
208. Id. at 248.
209. See id. at 249.
210. See id. at 263-64.
211. See id.
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The Morissette Court rejected this argument. The Court held
that would be acceptable to interpret an omission of mental ele-
ment from a criminal statute as a legislative intent to impose strict
liability in the instance of "public welfare" offenses where the pen-
alties for violation were small and a conviction did not greatly hurt
one's reputation.212 Where a criminal statute was based on a com-
mon-law crime such as larceny, however, an omission as to the
mental state had to be interpreted very differently. 213 Such crimes
were distinguishable from public welfare statutes in that they
were not created to impose a duty of care to ameliorate the poten-
tial for harm inherent in an industrialized society, but were
designed to punish "positive aggressions or invasions," such as of-
fenses against the state, the person, property, or public morals. 21 4
Such crimes were harshly punished, and subjected the actor to
public disgrace.215 These common-law crimes had from time im-
memorial been understood to have contained a mens rea ele-
ment.216 Therefore, when a legislature fashioned a criminal
statute based on a common-law crime concept, the legislature was
to be understood as having imported the mens rea element into the
new statute.217 Thus, the statute in question, which was geared
towards the punishment of larceny-type crimes, must also require
mens rea as to the defendant's knowledge as to the ownership of
the property.218 The term "knowing," the Morissette Court held,
should not be read as a modification of that mens rea requirement
as to ownership of property in larceny- type crimes. 219 Logically, a
larceny-type crime would include "knowing" conversions in the
sense that one knew one had taken goods into one's possession, but
not "unknowing" conversions, which might be actionable only at
tort law.220 Therefore, the specification of the mental element of
"knowing" should not be read as an imposition of strict liability as
212. See id. at 256.
213. See id. at 262-63.
214. Id. at 255.
215. See id. at 260.
216. See id. at 262-63.
217. See id. at 263.
218. See id. at 269-72.
219. See id.
220. See id.
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to knowledge of ownership as to goods, but merely as a specifica-
tion of what types of conversions would be punished.221
The United States Supreme Court-albeit not entirely consist-
ently222-has since expanded the Morissette doctrine to statutes
that were not crimes at common law, but, like the statutory rape
and child molestation laws, could arguably to be a public-welfare
crime in which strict criminal liability would be justified under
Morissette. For example, the Court has refused to read strict liabil-
ity into anti-price-fixing statutes.223 It has also refused to read the
statute criminalizing the possession of an unregistered machine
gun as imposing strict liability as to the defendant's knowledge of
whether his weapon had automatic firing capacity.224 Further-
more, the Court has also refused to read the statute regarding the
receiving, transporting and shipping of sexually explicit material
to impose strict liability as to the defendant's knowledge of the age
of the performer, despite the fact that a natural grammatical read-
ing of the statute might suggest that mens rea was only required as
to the knowledge that one had received, shipped, or transported
some video or printed material.225
Similarly, in the period just prior to the repeal and revision of
the present sexual assault code, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
had been presented with a number of cases involving criminal stat-
utes that were silent as to intent. However, despite the silence, the
221. See id.
222. For a complete treatment of the United States Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation cases, see Singer & Husak, supra note 148, at 861 (arguing, gener-
ally, that while the United States Supreme Court may not have constitutionally
enshrined mens rea, the Court appears to have adopted a general presumption
against strict liability).
223. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-42
(1978).
224. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 613-15 (1994). But see United
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (imposing strict liability as to knowledge
of whether hand grenades were registered, noting that most people would be
placed upon notice that the possession of hand grenades were not an "innocent
act," and therefore were under a duty to inquire as to the legality of their actions).
225. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1994).
Admittedly, Justice Rehnquist, in dicta, observes that interpreting a statute to im-
pose strict liability might be more justified in the case of a person accused of actu-
ally producing the video, or of having intercourse with an underaged person, as
both would have had more contact with the minor in question. See id. at 71 n.2. In
any case, the United States Supreme Court will not be called upon to interpret the
federal statutes regarding statutory rape, as they already make provision for mis-
take of age for those over twelve. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
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court appeared to presume that strict liability was not intended in
these statutes. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has also explic-
itly considered the statutory construction rules raised in the Moris-
sette line of cases, beginning with Rhode Island's drug possession
statutes. In State v. Gilman,226 the defendant demurred to his in-
dictment for drug possession on the grounds that it punished those
who were unaware of the fact that they were in possession of
drugs, and was therefore unconstitutional.227 Read literally, the
Gilman court noted, the statute criminalizing the possession of
barbiturates or amphetamines did impose strict liability regard-
less of whether or not the defendant actually knew the substance
was in his possession, or knew the nature of the substance that he
possessed. 228 The Gilman court noted that the imposition of strict
liability was not necessarily unconstitutional. 229 Furthermore, the
legislature had the right to impose strict liability statutes in the
interests of public health and safety-particularly in those "public
welfare" types of offenses described in Morissette, which a drug
statute could arguably fall into. In fact, although not cited by the
Gilman court, an earlier Rhode Island decision had interpreted the
statute regarding the possession of intoxicating liquors as strict li-
ability crime. 230 At the time, some jurisdictions did in fact punish
unaware possession. 231 Thus could be argued that the General As-
sembly's silence had in fact been intended to impose such strict
liability.
The Gilman court, however, chose not to rest on any decision
regarding due process. Furthermore, it specifically chose not to
limit itself to the common-law/public welfare crime division in
Morissette.232 The court instead simply chose to resolve the ques-
tion in favor of protecting "the name and reputation of the individ-
ual in whose building, automobile, luggage or clothing are found
226. 291 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1975).
227. See id. at 429.
228. See id.
229. See id. (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)) (permitting
strict liability in laws pertaining to sale of narcotics).
230. See State v. Hughes, 16 A. 911, 913 (R.I. 1889) (upholding a conviction for
maintaining a common nuisance, i.e., a "building, place, or tenement used for the
illegal sale and keeping of intoxicating liquors," despite lack of jury instruction
that defendant must be found to know that the liquor being sold there was
intoxicating).
231. See Gilman, 291 A.2d at 431 & n.5.
232. See id. at 430
20001
538 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 5:499
liquor, narcotics or similar commodities which were surreptitiously
placed there by another."233 Therefore, the Gilman court inter-
preted the statute to include an intent element into the drug pos-
session statute, noting that the term "possess" by some courts was
interpreted as including conscious knowledge of the nature of the
object in one's possession.234 As a natural extension to Gilman,
other possessory-type crimes were covered. 235
Where earlier interpretations of a similar statute did require a
mens rea, the court has followed it. In State v. Drew,23 6 the defend-
ant was convicted of obstructing an officer while in execution of his
duties. Again, the statute was silent as to intent. On appeal, the
court was called upon to consider the specific question of whether
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article
I, Section 10 of the Rhode Island Declaration of Rights required
that a conviction rest upon the person's knowing that the person
that he obstructed was an officer, or that he knowingly obstructed
the officer.23 7 The Supreme Court once again never specifically
ruled on when due process required such a mental element, 238
Here, however, there was an earlier holding regarding a similar
statute stating that this was not a strict liability crime. In 1879,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v. Maloney239 had re-
quired that an indictment or complaint for the crime must show
that the defendant knew the officer to be an officer when he ob-
233. Id. at 431.
234. See id. at 430.
235. See State v. Benevides, 425 A.2d 77, 80 (R.I. 1981) (extending Gilman to
instances of unknowing possession of a concealed weapon); State v. Motyka, 298
A.2d 793, 794 (R.I. 1973) (extending conscious possession requirements of Gilman
to instances of constructive possession of stolen property). But see State v.
Sharburno, 429 A.2d 1294, 1296 (R.I. 1981) (refusing to imply specific intent into
drug possession statute, and therefore refusing to permit the defense of intoxica-
tion); State v. Johnson, 414 A.2d 477, 479-80 (R.I. 1980) (refusing to interpret the
concealed weapon statute to include an implied intent to use the weapon unlaw-
fully); State v. Ahneida, 304 A.2d 894, 898 (R.I. 1973) (refusing to extend Gilman
to an instance where the defendant argued that the General Assembly had errone-
ously included cannabis in the statutory prohibitions against "narcotics," when sci-
entifically, it was not. The defendant attempted to argue that his due process
rights were violated because the statute thus penalized the possessor without re-
quiring a showing that the possessor knew of the nature of the contraband.).
236. 308 A.2d 516 (R.I. 1973).
237. See id. at 518.
238. See id.
239. 12 R.I. 251, 253-54 (1879).
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structed him.2 40 The Drew court chose to follow this interpreta-
tion, and thus held that similarly, the present statute did not
impose strict liability.2 4 1
Finally, three years before the creation of the present first and
second degree child molestation statutes, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court had already asserted that child abuse statutes
were no exception to the presumption against strict liability. In
State v. Lima,2 42 the defendant babysitter was accused of child
abuse after placing a child of two in scalding water, causing the
child to become seriously burned.24 3 The trial judge refused to in-
struct the jury on mental element, since one was not required in
the statute. The court, however, overturned the conviction, declar-
ing that if the General Assembly did not include a mental element
in a criminal statute, the courts would fill in the blanks when in-
structing its juries: "As a general proposition, where the requisite
intent is not defined in a statute establishing a criminal offense
such intent should be explicated in an instruction."2 44 An instruc-
tion as to intent would only be inappropriate where the statute
was "clearly intended" to impose strict liability.2 45 In absence of
that clear intent to impose strict liability, the court used the Model
Penal Code's default intent provision: "[wihen the culpability suffi-
cient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed
by law, such element is established if a person acts purposefully,
knowingly, or recklessly with respect thereto."2 46 Interestingly
enough, the court made no attempt to interpret the General As-
sembly's intention. Instead, the court simply asserted it felt such
an instruction as to mental element struck an appropriate balance
between the rights of a defendant and the state's interest in pro-
tecting children: "We view such an instruction as protecting a de-
fendant from a conviction predicated upon an act devoid of mens
rea while at the same time protecting a class of defenseless victims
from physical abuse."247
240. See id.
241. See Drew, 308 A.2d at 518.
242. 546 A.2d 770 (R.I. 1988).
243. See id. at 771
244. Id. (citing Marcinski v. United States, 479 A.2d 856, 861 (D.C. App. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1224 (1985)).
245. See id. at n.2.
246. Id. at 772. (citing Model Penal Code, § 2.02(3) at 226 (1985)).
247. Id.
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In light of the precedents regarding implied intent, a judicial
interpretation imposing strict liability on Rhode Island's statutory
rape and child molestation law immediately emerges as incongru-
ous. Beyond a doubt, the prohibition against engaging in sexual
activities with an underage person is part of our common-law tra-
dition. It has long been considered a species of rape, always con-
sidered a serious offense against the person. These offenses are
seriously punished-far more harshly than some of the other
crimes for which the Rhode Island Supreme Court refused to im-
pose strict liability. Third degree sexual assault is punishable by a
sentence of up to five years.248 Those convicted of first degree child
molestation sexual assault are punished by a "not less than twenty
(20) years, and may be imprisoned for life."249 Sexual contact with
a person under fourteen, that is, second degree child molestation
sexual assault,250 is punished by a term "not less than six years
nor more than thirty (30) years."251 Furthermore, persons con-
victed of either third degree sexual assault or first or second-degree
child molestation sexual assault are subject to the registration and
community notification requirements of Rhode Island's equivalent
to Megan's Law.252 Clearly, then, sexual offenses against children
are quite unlike the petty "public welfare" offenses for which strict
liability might be acceptably imposed. In any case, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court has apparently not considered itself con-
strained by Morissette's "public welfare" and "common law" crime
categories, or even, in Lima, the argument that strict liability was
necessary to protect children. Instead, the court has simply re-
fused to read strict liability into silence.
Despite these holdings, however, the Yanez majority has in
fact read strict liability into utter silence. The Yanez majority at-
tempts to argue that the General Assembly's silence should be read
as a deliberate intent to impose strict liability. As noted, it bases
its interpretation partially upon the fact that the General Assem-
bly did make some provisions as to mental state in other aspects of
the sexual assault statute, but not as to the statutory rape and
248. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-7 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
249. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
250. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.3 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
251. R.I. Gen. Laws. § 11-37-8.4 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
252. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1 (1956) (1999 Supp.).
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child molestation provisions.25 3 On the other hand, as Morissette
teaches, such a narrow, textual reading of intent elements may not
necessarily be dispositive when we are reading statutes with long
common-law roots which would historically require a mens rea. As
the Morissette court noted, the provision of a mental element as to
one aspect of the statute-that is, a knowing conversion-did not
necessarily obviate the requirement that the accused have known
the property was not abandoned. Similarly, there is in fact a
strong argument that the General Assembly's provision of a
mental element for the sexual assaults involving persons whom
the defendant "knows or should know" was physically or mentally
disabled, or who had engaged in an assault under the guise of a
medical examination was in fact never intended to modify the
mental elements as to assaults involving underage persons.254 In-
stead, it is entirely possible that those provisions were merely to
carve out exceptions to the defense of consent as to the provisions
for sexual assault as to adults.255
Furthermore, the Yanez majority apparently attempts to infer
a legislative intent to impose strict liability based upon the "tradi-
tional" understanding that the defense of reasonable mistake as to
age would not be permitted. 256 This argument, too, fails, under
principles of statutory construction. The General Assembly is pre-
sumed to legislate in harmony with existing law. 25 7 In Rhode Is-
land, however, that existing law never included strict liability as to
age. As the dissent correctly points out, the General Assembly
could not have counted on any background supposition that statu-
tory rape and child molestation was a strict liability crime, for at
no point in its three hundred and fifty year history did either the
Rhode Island courts or legislature ever take this stance when deal-
ing with its statutory rape laws. 258 The General Assembly would
thus no longer be able to rely upon the general understanding that
statutory rape and child molestation laws imposed strict liability
as to age. 259 Furthermore, the General Assembly is also charged
253. See discussion at Section IVA, supra.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 766 (R.I. 1998).
257. See Smith v. Retirement Bd. of Employees' Retirement Sys., 656 A.2d 186,
189 (R.I. 1995).
258. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 785 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 782.
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with the knowledge that in the immediate period prior to the revi-
sion of the sexual assault statutes and the development of the child
molestation statute, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had indi-
cated its distinct reluctance to impose strict criminal liability on its
own. Finally, as the dissent also suggests, although this knowl-
edge would not be binding upon the General Assembly, it is signifi-
cant because by the time Rhode Island revised its sexual assault
statutes, as a result of Hernandez and its progeny, the General As-
sembly-assuming that it considered the issue at all-denied the
defense notwithstanding repeated challenges. 260
Therefore, the inescapable conclusion one draws is that had
the General Assembly in its solicitude towards the youth and chil-
dren of Rhode Island determined that strict liability as to age was
necessary, it would have taken the safest route in ensuring that a
strict liability component did not get lost in the implied intent doc-
trine and thus explicitly imposed strict criminal liability in the
third degree sexual assault and child molestation statutes. Thus,
the attempt to read an implied strict liability into the child moles-
tation statute based either on the legislative silence as to the in-
tent elements of the crime, or the "traditional" view of statutory
rape, ultimately emerges as incongruous with precedents on the
construction of criminal laws involving serious, common-law of-
fenses such as statutory rape. Under these precedents, precisely
the opposite view should have prevailed: that Alejandro was enti-
tled to present a defense of a reasonable mistake as to the com-
plainant's age.
C. Implied Intent and the Statutory Rape/Child Molestation
Statutes
The Yanez majority's holding is made more dubious because
over the past few years, the child molestation statutes have been
treated as no exception to the implied intent theories expressed in
Morissette and Lima. 261 In general, prior to Yanez, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court had been broadly interpreting the intent ele-
ments of the ambiguously-worded child molestation statutes to
avoid the possibility that they might entrap persons who had
evinced no intent to abuse a child.
260. See id. at 782 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
261. See id.
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The consideration of whether there was an implied intent ele-
ment in the child molestation statutes first arose as a challenge to
the constitutionality of the second-degree child molestation statute
in State v. Tobin.262 Second-degree child molestation is defined as
"sexual contact" with a person under the age of fourteen. 263 "Sex-
ual contact" was defined as "the intentional touching of the victim's
or accused's intimate parts, clothed or unclothed, if that inten-
tional touching can be reasonably construed as intended by the ac-
cused for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or assault."26 4
In Tobin, the defendant appealed from his conviction of second-de-
gree sexual assault of his niece on the grounds that the jury in-
struction, which tracked the statute, was insufficient because it
failed to instruct the jury that the conviction must be based on the
defendant's intent to engage in the sexual contact for his own pur-
pose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault.26 5 Such a reading
of the statute, the defendant argued, was unconstitutional. 266
While not specifically striking down the statute as unconstitu-
tional, the Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed that there were
difficulties with convicting on the complainant's interpretation of
the defendant's conduct rather than upon the defendant's own
mens rea.267 Such an interpretation creates a potential for an ef-
fective imposition of strict liability in that the defendant could be
convicted without any actual finding of an intent to engage in the
sexual contact. Instead, a jury might feel that it was required to
convict based upon what the defendant may have intended when
touching the child. A person could then be convicted under mis-
taken or accidental touching, or intentional, but non-sexual touch-
ing, such as bathing a child. In support of its holding, the court
cited Morissette's observation that the notion of mens rea is so
deeply rooted in common law that even if the enactment was silent
on intent, mens rea was implied.268 Therefore, the court followed
its precedent in Lima by requiring that the trial justice on remand
instruct the jury that in order to sustain a conviction, it must find
that the defendant acted with the intent to arouse or gratify him-
262. 602 A.2d 528 (R.I. 1992).
263. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.4 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
264. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment & 1999 Supp.).
265. See Tobin, 602 A.2d at 534.
266. See id. at 531.
267. See id. at 534.
268. See id.
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self sexually.269 The court once again expressed its comfort with
the balance it struck between protecting defendants and
children.270
Several years later, the Rhode Island Supreme Court extended
Tobin to the first degree child molestation statute, which encom-
passes sexual penetration of persons under fourteen.271 In State v.
Griffith,272 the defendant was charged with first degree child mo-
lestation, having allegedly penetrated the complainant's vagina
with his finger. Penetration was defined as "sexual intercourse,
cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion,
however slight, by any part of a person's body or by any object into
the genital or anal openings of another person's body, but the emis-
sion of semen is not required."273 No specific intent element, of
course, is provided here at all, whereas one might be gleaned from
the provisions regarding "sexual contact." Furthermore, As the
newly-appointed Justices Bourcier and Lederberg pointed out
when the court revisited the issue in a later case, one could argue
that the definition of sexual penetration was merely an extension
of the common-law definition of rape, that is, vaginal penetration,
for which only a general intent was required. 274 Given that the
other types of intrusion were included in the same passage as
these general intent elements, requiring a specific intent for digital
penetration does not comport with the textual type of analysis em-
ployed by the Yanez majority. However, the Griffith court held that
as with the definition of "sexual contact," there was an implied spe-
cific intent element that the defendant to have engaged in the pen-
etration for the purpose of arousal or gratification. Without such a
269. See id. at 534-35
270. See id.
271. See R.I. Gen. Laws 11-37-8.1 (1994 Reenactment).
272. 660 A.2d 704 (R.I. 1995). The Griffith opinion itself never states precisely
what manner in which the defendant allegedly engaged in sexual penetration. Nor
does the earlier opinion in this case. See Griffith v. State, 612 A.2d 21 (R.I. 1992).
The court in a later case stated that Griffith allegedly engaged in digital penetra-
tion. See State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 782 (R.I. 1996).
273. Griffith, 660 A.2d at 705 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws§ 11-37-1 (1956) (1981 Re-
enactment), as amended by P.L. 1986, ch. 191, § 1). This section defining "sexual
penetration" has since been amended to include penetration with objects perpe-
trated not only by another person, but by 'the victim's own body upon the accused's
instruction." R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1 (1999 Supp.).
274. See State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 785-86 (R.I. 1996) (Bourcier, J., &
Lederberg, J., dissenting).
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reading, the jury could convict for any volitional, but innocent
touching.275 As the court explained:
We believe that the first-degree child-molestation sexual-
assault statute, like its second-degree sexual-assault counter-
part, has an implied mens rea requirement requiring that the
state must prove that a defendant must act with the intent of
sexual arousal or gratification in order to be guilty of the of-
fense. It is true that our Legislature can enact strict liability
statutes devoid of any mens rea; however, first-degree child-
molestation sexual assault, which carries a minimum twenty-
year sentence, is not a strict liability offense.276
In short, the court specifically stated that first-degree child
molestation was no exception to the court's refusal to read strict
liability into a silent or ambiguous statute, and clearly demon-
strated its intent to give defendants the benefit of any possible in-
terpretational differences.
The Yanez majority, however, attempts to limit the import of
Griffith on two bases. First, it notes that in other jurisdictions, and
in the eyes of other commentators, the harsh penalties are imposed
along with strict liability. 27 7 Secondly, it points out that Griffith
has been limited by State v. Bryant.278 Bryant involved a charge of
anal intercourse with penile penetration. 279 Here, the court did
refuse to require a Griffith instruction. 28 0 Bryant distinguished
Griffith by separating the old and new portions of the definition of
first degree sexual assault statute. The Bryant court noted that
rape at common law only encompassed vaginal penetration by the
penis, and was a general intent crime. 28 ' Obviously, however,
when the new definitions of "penetration" for the purposes of the
sexual assault statutes came to include not only "intercourse, cun-
275. See id. at 707.
276. Id. at 706-07 (emphasis added).
277. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 769 (R.I. 1998) (citing Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-3-65 (1972) ("Every person eighteen (18) years of age or older who shall be
convicted of rape by carnally and unlawfully knowing a child under the age of four-
teen (14) years, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for
life in the State Penitentiary.") (emphasis added); Collins v. State, 691 So. 2d 918,
922-23 (Miss. 1997) (rejecting mistake of fact defense); Bowes Sayre, supra note
91, at 73-74.
278. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 765 (citing State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I.
1996)).
279. See id. at 778.
280. See id. at 783.
281. See id.
20001 545
546 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:499
nilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse," but also "any other intru-
sion, however slight, by an part of a person's body or by any object
into the genital or anal openings of another person's body .. ,"282
there were obvious concerns that an innocent touching could be
construed as a sexual offense, and a specific intent element was
necessary to ensure that the statute did not outrun its intent and
punish those who had had no intent to abuse a child.28 3 For exam-
ple, without the element of sexual gratification, even medical treat-
ment could be punished. This concern, of course, does not apply to
cases of purposeful penile penetration, which logically precluded
any such finding of innocent touching. The Yanez majority, how-
ever, interprets this as a general rule that no instruction as to the
intent of the defendant was necessary in cases involving penile
penetration:
We further stated that "first-degree child-molestation
sexual assault, which carries a minimum twenty-year sen-
tence, is not a strict liability offense." Yanez relies on this
dictum and invites us to extend the mens rea requirement to
the second element of the statute. We do not read Griffith
this broadly, however, since we have subsequently deter-
mined that this implied mens rea is applicable only in cases
that do not involve penile penetration. Thus the mens rea
necessary in cases involving penile penetration is implicit in
the intentional doing of the act.28 4
The Yanez majority's analysis fails on several grounds. First
of all, as we have noted, unlike the other states, whose interpreta-
tion of the law is not binding upon us, there is little evidence that
the General Assembly, when imposing the severe penalties, ever
reflected upon whether or not strict liability was to be imposed in
child molestation cases. Additionally, given the long history of the
court's refusal to interpret strict liability into criminal statutes,
and given the court's earlier care in ensuring that the child moles-
tation statutes did not sweep beyond their protective purpose, it is
difficult to dismiss the court's pronouncement in Griffith as mere
"dicta."
Furthermore, Bryant did not do away with the necessity of
mens rea in first degree child molestation crimes involving penile
282. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment & 1999 Supp.).
283. See Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 783 (R.I. 1996).
284. Yanez, 716 A.2d at 767 (citations omitted).
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penetration. While partially basing their interpretation of the
mental element necessary for penetration on the common law tra-
ditions, which never required a specific intent as to the defendant's
arousal or gratification, the Bryant court's refusal to interpret the
statute as requiring a specific intent ultimately lies in the common
sense of the matter: little if any principled argument can be made
that "purposeful" penile penetration is for any purpose other than
arousal or gratification. Therefore, there is no need to require any
specific mental element, since it would be obvious that the defend-
ant intended to abuse a child. This rationale, however, does not
apply to a third degree sexual assault or child molestation statute,
where there is a question as to whether the defendant was mis-
taken as to the complainant's age. The complainant's age, of
course, is the sine qua non of these crimes. Whether a defendant
should have or could have known of his sexual partner's age is cer-
tainly open to interpretation. Therefore, the denial of the defense
creates the risk that those who have never intended to abuse a
child will be punished.
Furthermore, the Yanez majority seems to be confused about
the nature of a reasonable mistake of fact defense. Apparently, the
court appears to believe that the defense requires that the prosecu-
tion prove a specific intent to engage in sexual intercourse with a
person of a particular age. A specific intent crime, as read through
the eyes of Bryant, does rest upon proof and an assessment of the
defendant's subjective intent. The reasonable mistake as to age
defense, however, does not ultimately rest entirely on Yanez's sub-
jective intention. Instead, it includes an objective test as to
whether outward appearances would have led a reasonable person
to make a mistake. Such a reasonable mistake as to facts has long
been considered sufficient to negate the mental state for a general
intent crime.28 5 Given that Bryant did not disturb Tobin or Grif-
fith's pronouncement that first degree child molestation was not
and could not be a strict liability crime, a reasonable mistake of
fact defense is still a permissible defense even after Bryant.28 6
285. See LaFave & Scott, supra note 16, at 577; Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249,
250 (N.M. 1990).
286. Of course, we note that the other decisions required a specific intent. If
that level of mental element were in fact imposed, then even an unreasonable mis-
take as to the complainant's age would be a sufficient defense. See LaFave & Scott,
supra note 16, at 578.
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Additionally, the Yanez majority's holding is made more anom-
alous by the fact that not six months prior to its decision, the court
implied that reasonable mistake as to identity would be accepted
as a defense to second-degree child molestation. In State v.
Tevay,2 7 the complainant, the defendant's stepdaughter, testified
that she went into the defendant's bedroom on her mother's in-
structions in order to wake him for work. The defendant at trial
denied that he had had any such sexual contact with his step-
daughter. However, the defendant admitted that he was a very
heavy sleeper and that on some occasions when his wife woke him,
he would pull her into bed. Therefore, he conceded, there was a
"ten percent chance" that this incident may have taken place, with
his mistaking his stepdaughter for his wife and without recalling it
later.288 When instructing the jury, the trial judge refused to in-
struct on mistake of fact, but did include accidental conduct, advis-
ing the jurors "that [Tevay] may not be found guilty of conduct
which you feel from the evidence, causes you to conclude the con-
duct was accidental."28 9
In a per curiam decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
found that the instruction was adequate. The court held that in
this instance, both accident and mistake of fact related to the same
defense theory, and therefore the instruction was not inadequate:
"In other words the accident was the mistaken belief that Jody was
Tevay's wife. Therefore, we conclude the jurors were adequately
informed that if they had found Tevay's conduct towards Jody was
unintentional, for any reason, they were to return a verdict of not
guilty."2 90
The Yanez majority rejects the idea that this case mandates a
mistake of fact as to age defense, pointing out that no specific hold-
ing was made as to whether the defense of mistake was allowed. 291
As it observes: "Our holding in Tevay has no relevance to the case
at bar since Tevay merely reflects our common sense determina-
tion that a touching that is 'accidental' cannot have been intended
for any reason, including for purposes of sexual arousal or gratifi-
287. 707 A.2d 700 (R.I. 1998).
288. See id. at 701.
289. Id. at 702.
290. Id.
291. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 768-69 (R.I. 1998).
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cation."292 This distinction, too, is questionable. A mistake of fact
instruction was likely not warranted by Tevay's theory of the de-
fense, which was that Tevay had acted in a virtually somnambulis-
tic state, and was not acting volitionally, under a mistaken
impression as to the facts of the situation - as Yanez claims to
have done. The term "accident," of course, is generally understood
to include non-volitional conduct, and therefore the jury would
have been given enough of an instruction allowing it to acquit if it
believed Tevay's version of the facts. The Tevay court may have left
its decision there. On the other hand, the Tevay court went much
further. As Justice Flanders points out, the above-cited language
in the Tevay opinion specifically broadens the term of "accident" to
include mistake of fact, and appears to have and expressly con-
doned the jury acquitting on those grounds. 293 In any case, how-
ever we want to characterize the defense permitted by Tevay, as
the dissent points out, we are still in inconsistent position of appar-
ently permitting a jury to hear evidence, assess credibility, and
possibly acquit a person who claims to have engaged in sexual con-
duct with a minor based upon the belief that he or she was some-
body else 2 4-arguably an even less believable position than a
mistake as to age.
Read in the light of these earlier cases, the Yanez majority's
holding emerges not only as a questionable statutory interpreta-
tion, but a substantial retreat from its earlier reluctance to impose
strict liability for serious crimes, including child molestation. Even
if one does not agree with the broader proposition that Griffith or
Tevay alone mandates a reasonable mistake as to age defense, it is
significant that the court had previously attempted to ensure that
a set of child molestation statutes with absent or ambiguous intent
elements did not sweep beyond their protective intent to punish
those who never intended to sexually abuse a child or youth. With
Yanez, however, the court calls an abrupt halt. Once presented
with the question of mistake as to age, the court reverts to cruder,
strict-liability interpretation that does not differentiate between a
292. Id.
293. See id. at 774 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
294. See id. Flanders points out that Massachusetts, resting on its earlier hold-
ings refusing the defense of reasonable mistake as to age, has at least been consis-
tent and refused to recognize this mistake of identity defense. See id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Knap, 592 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Mass. 1992)).
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true sexual offender and a young person who was honestly and rea-
sonably misled as to the age of his sexual partner, and ultimately,
creates the risk that a defendant will be branded as a child mo-
lester regardless of any intent to engage in deviant conduct.
V. REASONABLE MISTAKE AS TO AGE AND PUBLIC POLICY
The Yanez majority and Justice Flanders' dissenting views on
reasonable mistake as to age spring in part from competing views
on the purpose of the child molestation statute. Justice Flanders
questions the proposition that the child molestation statutes were
ever intended to reach situations involving two youths, and thus
takes the position that a reasonable mistake as to age is necessary
in order to effectuate the General Assembly's intent to allow juries
to "sort out true cases of child molestation from those involving
premarital sex between teenagers based upon a mistaken but rea-
sonably held belief that both were old enough to do so legally."295
The Yanez majority, on the other hand, takes the position that in-
tercourse with a person under fourteen, even with a person close in
age, is a presumptively harmful and abusive act.29 6 Given that
295. Id. at 773 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
296. See id. at 770 & n. 8 (observing that while the third degree sexual assault
statute does not criminalize sexual intercourse with persons between 14 and 16
unless the actor is over 18, the child molestation laws make no distinctions regard-
ing the defendant's age).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has in fact held that even a person under
the age of fourteen can be convicted of child molestation. See In re Odell, 672 A.2d
457, 459-60 (R.I. 1996) (upholding finding of delinquency of person under 14 for
first-degree child molestation of girl aged 11). However, Odell apparently involved
an assault upon one person under fourteen by another, rather than consensual
conduct. This use of the child molestation statute to reach non-consensual conduct
raises special problems, which will be discussed later. See note 327, infra.
Additionally, the Yanez majority apparently attempts to cast the child moles-
tation statute as a measure designed to protect the health of minors. See Yanez,
716 A.2d at 766 (citing State v. Ware, 418 A.2d 1, 4 (R.I. 1980); Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1981))). However, the
Yanez majority's reliance upon these cases as a final statement of the purposes of
this statute is somewhat misplaced. Ware does not deal with the child molestation
statute. Instead, it deals with Rhode Island's former carnal knowledge and abuse
statute, which protected only girls under 16. Michael M. deals with a similar Cali-
fornia statute. Both cases involved the issue of whether statutory rape provision
that only punished males could survive an equal protection challenge. See Ware,
418 A.2d at 4; Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471-73. Both statutes survived this chal-
lenge based upon the rationale that the statute was intended to protect young wo-
men from disease, pregnancy, and injury due to intercourse. See Ware, 418 A.2d at
4; Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471-73. However, as the Michael M. Court conceded, at
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consensual sexual activity between two peers has, for obvious rea-
sons, traditionally been a low law-enforcement priority,297 Justice
Flanders' version arguably mores closely approaches the spirit of
the child molestation laws. However, even if we did accept the
Yanez majority's belief that the statute was meant to encompass
situations involving two youths close in age, the Yanez majority's
unanalyzed assumption that strict liability is necessary to prevent
child molestation ultimately fails under closer examination.
To some extent, the argument that strict liability is necessary
to fulfill the protective functions of the statutory rape and child
molestation statutes may seem even more compelling today than
in the time of Hernandez. Although once considered unspeakable,
beginning in the 1980s, when Rhode Island first enacted its child
molestation statutes, the crime of sexual abuse of children and
youths gained recognition as a major social problem demanding
strong government action.298 As the New Jersey Supreme Court
observed when upholding the state's community notification laws,
the sexual abuse of children and youths has been associated with a
number of serious debilitating psychological disorders, such as
chronic depression and anxiety, isolation and poor social adjust-
ment, substance abuse, and suicide. 299 These negative effects ap-
parently persist into adulthood.300 Worse, still, are the apparent
effects upon the next generation; studies suggest that sexually
abused boys tend to be more likely to become sex offenders them-
selves, and sexually abused girls are more likely to have children
who are sexually abused.301 Over the past decade, sexual abuse
even has been associated with the problem of teenage pregnancy,
their inception, the statutory rape statutes may have been more aimed at imposing
a standard of morality rather than protecting health and preventing pregnancy.
See id. at 470. In any case, this equal protection analysis ultimately did not need
to rest on the "actual" purpose of the statute, but on any rational basis the state
can assert for a gender-based classification. See id. In any case, the present third
degree sexual assault statute - which obviously covers the more active and fertile
group - does not punish intercourse with persons under sixteen where the actor is
under 18 himself or herself. See R.I. Gen. Laws. § 11-37-6 (1956) (1994 Reenact-
ment). Thus, the argument that the statutes were intended as health measures
naturally suffers.
297. See Oberman, supra note 118, at 23, 38 & n. 114.
298. See Phipps, supra note 109, at 80.
299. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 375-76 (N.J. 1995) (quoting Br. for the
United States at 5-8 (citations omitted)).
300. See Phipps, supra note 109, at 90-95.
301. See Doe, 662 A.2d at 375-76.
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with recent studies claiming that a high percentage of teenage
pregnancies occur where there is a disparity in age between the
teenage mother and her partner.30 2
For better or worse, our courts and legislatures have re-
sponded to this sense that extraordinary measures are necessary
to protect youths and children from sexual abuse. Therefore, vari-
ous measures have been taken to make a conviction for sexual
abuse easier to obtain and the penalties harsher. For example, evi-
dentiary standards are relaxed to allow the substantive use of
prior episodes of sexual abuse. 303 Courts have begun to admit con-
troversial "recovered memory" evidence in trials for sexual abuse
taking place many years previously.30 4 Rhode Island itself in 1984
imposed a mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence on all those
convicted of first-degree child molestation.30 5 Those convicted of
crimes involving sexual abuse of children and youths are subject to
registration and community notification requirements. 30 6 Some
jurisdictions have even taken the radical step of "chemically cas-
trating" those convicted of sexual abuse crimes.307 In other juris-
dictions, those convicted of sex offenses may be subject to civil
confinement after completion of their sentences-with the appar-
ent blessing of the United States Supreme Court.308
302. See, Elizabeth Hollenberg, The Criminalization of Teenage Sex: Statutory
Rape and the Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 267, 269-272
(1999) (criticizing studies as exaggerating problem of older men impregnating
young girls).
303. See, eg., State v. Hopkins, 698 A.2d 183 (R.I. 1997) (permitting admission
of prior uncharged sexual misconduct to show "common scheme or plan" to molest
young boys). See also Fed. R. Evid. 413 (permitting admission of similar crimes in
sexual assault cases); Fed. R. Evid. 414 (permitting admission of similar crimes in
child molestation cases).
304. Rhode Island has already rejected expert testimony as to repressed mem-
ory as unreliable. See State v. Quattrocchi, 1999 WL 284882 (R.I. Super. 1999).
305. See, eg., R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
306. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment & Supp.
1999).
307. See Linda Beckman, Chemical Castration: Constitutional Issues of Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 100 W. Va. L. Rev.
853, 854 (1998) (describing California's requirement that second-time offenders ac-
cept MPA treatment as a condition of parole).
308. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding Kansas' Sexually
Violent Predator's Act, which allowed for civil commitment of those charged with
sexually violent crimes (including child molestation) and found to be suffering from
a "mental abnormality" predisposing the person to commit sexually violent
offenses).
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The idea that strict liability as to age is necessary to protect
youth, then, may seem part and parcel of a commitment to "zero
tolerance" for sexual abuse. On the other hand, one should keep in
mind that our newfound and sometimes dangerously uncritical
concern for youths and children has caused legal excesses before.
Over the past two decades, there have been instances of
overzealousness in investigating allegations of sexual abuse. The
results were flawed investigations that often blatantly coached
children into making allegations of wholesale abuse under out-
landish circumstances. The accused individuals in many cases
were exonerated only after years of public humiliation and crush-
ing legal expenses.30 9 Furthermore, the new methods of gaining
convictions and controlling sexual abusers-that is, relaxed evi-
dentiary standards, community notification and registration, and
mandatory sentencing-have not gone without criticism, both in
terms of their impact on defendants' rights and on their actual ef-
fectiveness in eliminating sexual abuse.310 Clearly, then, the as-
sertion that the imposition of strict liability as to age is necessary
309. See, eg., James Selkin & Peter G.W. Schouten, The Child Sexual Abuse
Case in the Courtroom: A Source Book 186-87 (1987) (detailing the frequency of
false reports, and criticizing the view held by some child-welfare workers that chil-
dren "never" lie about sexual abuse); Robert Rosenthal, State of New Jersey v. Mar-
garet Kelly Michaels: An Overview, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 246 (1995)
(describing the severely flawed investigation of sexual abuse allegations against
the defendant, a teacher at the Wee Care day care center); Brian McGrory, Just
Who Is Guilty Here?, Boston Globe, Oct. 22, 1999, at B1, available in 1999 WL
6087076 (commenting on Fells Acres day care case).
310. See, eg, Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 430-31 (N.J. 1995) (Stein, J., dissent-
ing) (noting incidents of vigilante action taken after community notification of a
released sex offender-in one instance, resulting in the beating of a person mis-
taken for the sex offender in question); Moira Johnston, Spectral Evidence: The
Ramona Case: Incest, Memory, and Truth on Trial in Napa Valley, 20 Women's
Rts. L. Rep. 49 (1998); Beckman, supra note 307, at 859-65 (detailing limitations of
chemical treatment for child molesters); Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Chil-
dren's Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1004, 1032-33 (1999)
(suggesting that the invalid questioning methods used in a number of day care
sexual abuse cases may have ultimately served to create confusion as to the credi-
bility of children in other cases); Leonore M.J. Simon, Sex Offender Legislation and
the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 485, 487 (1999) (criticizing
community notification statutes as lulling communities into a false sense of secur-
ity); Note, Heather E. Marsden, State v. Hopkins: The Stripping of Rhode Island
Rule of Evidence 404(b) Protections from Accused Sexual Offenders, 3 Roger Wil-
liams U.L. Rev. 333 (1998); DuJardin, supra note 69, at C3 (quoting Justice Rod-
gers' assertion that Yanez is an instance of why legislatures should be cautious
about passing minimum sentencing laws).
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to protect youth and children should also be more carefully
considered.
The Yanez majority bases its holding partially on the idea that
strict liability as to age is necessary in order to ensure that the
potential defendant take the utmost caution in order to avoid
breaking the law.311 This argument fails when one considers that
there are already more than ample incentives for a defendant to
exercise caution in selecting a sexual partner. It is well known
that the crime involves severe penalties. Indeed, even the folk wis-
dom advises us that underage girls are "jailbait," and admonishes
the prurient that "sixteen will get you twenty." Even if the defend-
ant is successful in his defense, he will have undergone the har-
rowing experience of confrontation with the police, possible pre-
trial detention, and a trial for sexual abuse of a minor. He will also
forever suffer the effects of the attendant publicity and loss of repu-
tation.312 The further imposition of a strict liability component-
which punishes no matter what degree of care the defendant
took-clearly is overkill in terms of deterrence and ensuring
caution.
To some extent, the insistence on strict liability was also based
upon a fear that the defendant would use a mistake of age defense
as an easy escape from liability because the claim of mistake as to
age will be difficult to rebut.313 A prosecutor will naturally have a
vast array of materials in order to rebut a claim of reasonable mis-
take of age, such as testimony from the victim herself about the
representations that she made about her age, photographs, and
the testimony of others regarding her mature appearance and de-
311. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 769 (R.I. 1998) (citing Bowes Sayre,
supra note 91, at 73-74.) "Unless defendants were made to determine at their peril
whether or not their victims fall within the class peculiarly needing the protection
of the law and thus set apart, there could be no real protection." Id.
312. See Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow Words
for the Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U.
Bridgeport L. Rev 175, 196-205 (1991) (describing the "media circus" frequently
attending sexual abuse allegations).
313. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 787 (Flanders, J., dissenting); Bowes Sayre, supra
note 91, at 73-74 n.68 ("Were ignorance as to the girl's age allowed as a defense,
any defendant by keeping in discreet ignorance as to his victim's age, could evade
punishment."); Attorney General Pine's comments, discussed supra at Introduc-
tion & n.22.
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meanor.3 14 Furthermore, our juries have long been entrusted to
listen to and evaluate credibility, often when dealing with complex
technical information. In fact, under our current case law, juries
are entrusted with claims of mistake as to identity, or a claim that
touching was non-sexual in intent.3 15 It is patently inconsistent to
state that it cannot properly assess a claim as to age. Finally, the
idea that allowing the defense will serve as an easy escape is sim-
ply not borne out in the experience of jurisdictions accepting the
defense, where triers of fact have apparently had no difficulty re-
jecting a claim of mistake as to age as unbelievable. 316
314. Of course, a prosecutor may have a distinct advantage over a defendant in
a courtroom setting, where the complainant may well be presenting a very differ-
ent image than during her encounters with the defendant. See People v. Battles,
240 Cal. App. 2d 122, 123 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
When appellant met her she wore a black dress, gold shoes, black stock-
ings, high heels and carried a gold purse. No doubt the court realized that
she appeared more mature to appellant than she did in court. It must be
presumed that appellant received the full benefit of the court's knowledge
that an artful woman can contrive a deceptive appearance of maturity or
youth, as the occasion requires; but it is clear that the court doubted that
appellant's downfall was one such occasion.
Id.
The Michigan Supreme Court raises the practical problem that while awaiting
a trial, a complainant may rapidly develop to the point where a defendant's claim
of mistake could seem credible to a jury that is seeing the complainant for the first
time, years after the fact. See People v. Cash, 351 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Mich. 1984).
However, in Rhode Island, this difficulty is somewhat overcome. There is already
a statutory provision for a speedier trial where the complainant is under fourteen.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-11.2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment). In any case, the pros-
ecutor will have a vast array of evidence to establish the complainant's level of
physical and social maturity at the time of the alleged abuse, such as photographs
and testimony from those close to the complainant.
315. See discussion at IIIC, supra.
316. See People v. Battles, 240 Cal. App. 2d 122, 123 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
State v. Ruska, 1996 WL 276390 (Wash. App. Div. 3) (1996) (unpublished deci-
sion); State v. Stepney, 1997 WL 765710 (Wash. App. Div. 2) (1997) (unpublished
opinion); State v. Hottinger, 461 S.E.2d 462 (W. Va. 1995). See also State v.
Parker, 887 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (accepting the general propo-
sition that mistake as to age was a defense to crime of having intercourse with a
person under 13, but observing that there was sufficient evidence on the record
that the defendant had at least behaved recklessly in regards to complainant's
age); Collins v. Mississippi, 691 So. 2d 918, 925 (Miss. 1997) (observing, even while
denying the defense, that defendant could not have reasonably believed she was of
the age of consent due to the fact that he had known complainant since infancy);
State v. Parker, 887 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that there
was sufficient evidence on the record that defendant had at least been reckless as
to determining the age of his partner).
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Furthermore, the insistence on strict liability as to age does
not comport with our knowledge of the circumstances as to when
sexual abuse takes place. Since the days of Prince, the state of our
knowledge regarding sexual abuse has been considerably refined.
Under the circumstances where most abuse occurs, the defense of
reasonable mistake as to age will not serve as an easy "out" for the
true abuser. As uncomfortable as the fact may be, and as much as
our legislative efforts may focus on "stranger danger," it is well-
recognized that most sexual abuse of children and youths is perpe-
trated by persons who already have a relationship with the child or
youth, that is, family, friends of the family, or persons in authority
over the child.317 Where there is already such a relationship with
the youth, a defendant would be unable to claim with any degree of
credibility that he did not or could not have known that the com-
plainant in question had not reached the statutory age of consent.
Therefore, allowing the defense of reasonable mistake of age will
not protect the majority of sexual abusers from punishment. How-
ever, where the individuals involved were strangers-or, as in
Yanez, mere acquaintances-there is more likelihood that an hon-
est and reasonable mistake can and will be made, and therefore,
that the innocent will suffer-again, without serving any preven-
tive purpose.
Additionally, our knowledge about the typical abuser has ex-
panded. Courts and legislatures have become aware of the fact
that those who sexually exploit children and youths suffer from
mental disorders. 318 Our own General Assembly demonstrated
awareness of this fact in 1986 with the enactment of a statute re-
quiring those convicted and imprisoned for child molestation to
seek treatment as a condition of parole. 319 It is also recognized
that this disorder is incredibly difficult to treat successfully.
Therefore-whether one agrees with the wisdom of this legislation
or not-Rhode Island, in common with many other jurisdictions,
requires registration for those convicted under the child molesta-
tion and third degree sexual assault statutes, and possible commu-
nity notification based upon an assessment of future
317. See Simon, supra note 310, at 490-95. See also Lucy Berliner, Nature &
Dynamics of Child Sexual Abuse, 2, in ABA Center on Children and the Law, A
Judicial Primer of Child Sexual Abuse, 2 (1994).
318. See Berliner, supra note 317, at 7-9.
319. See 1986 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 528 § 1 (now R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.7).
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dangerousness. 320 The concepts behind the statutes involved,
then, have changed from mere retribution, towards identification,
treatment and incapacitation of an offender who is assumed to
have a mental disorder causing him to commit this specific crime
again.321 Under this scheme, the denial of reasonable mistake as
to age emerges as incongruous. No matter what the level of care
the defendant took in determining that his partner was of an age
that the state declared was sufficiently mature to consent to inter-
course, he is treated in the same fashion as a person who had delib-
erately set out to abuse a youth or child. This is clearly an
absurdity, for in the words of the Model Penal Code:
[a] man who engages in consensual intercourse in the reason-
able belief that his partner has reached [the age of consent]
evidences no abnormality, no willingness to take advantage
of immaturity, no propensity to corruption of minors. In
short, he has demonstrated neither intent nor inclination to
violate any of the interests that the law of statutory rape
seeks to protect.322
This argument against strict liability become all the more
compelling where, as here, the case involves youths fairly close in
age. Although the ultimate line-drawing is better left to the legis-
lature, it is worth considering that young adults like Alejandro
commonly interact with younger teenagers on a social level. As a
result, young adults could arguably be placed at a higher risk than
older persons of getting involved in a situation where a mistake of
age could occur, and might require more leniency.
To some extent, it could be argued that strict liability should
be imposed where, as here, the complainant was less than fourteen
years of age. The Hernandez court, the Yanez majority observed,
had specifically stated that the mistake of fact defense should not
be permitted where the girl was "of tender years."323 However,
320. See 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 196, § 1, as amended by 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws
ch. 104 § 1 (now R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment & 1999
Supp.)).
321. See, eg., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 374-76 (N.J. 1995) (describing recidi-
vist rates as part of the justification for the registration and community notifica-
tion laws); Berliner, supra note 317, at 7-9 (describing the patterns of recividism of
offenders, as well as the tendency of offenders to deliberately seek out victims and
attempt to rationalize behavior).
322. Model Penal Code § 213.6, cmt. 2 at 415 (1980).
323. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 764 (R.I. 1998) (citing People v. Her-
nandez, 393 P.2d 673, 676 (Cal. 1964)).
2000]
558 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:499
where a child molestation statute extends to persons who in most
cases have developmentally proceeded well beyond childhood, the
denial of the mistake becomes more problematic. The limitation of
use of the defense to a judicially or statutorily-drawn age limit may
be somewhat justified where the line is drawn at a very early age,
such as ten, or perhaps twelve.324 However, at nearly fourteen,
youths drastically vary in terms of physical and social maturity.
325
Therefore, a case-by-case assessment of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the alleged mistake becomes all the more nec-
essary, in order to assure that there was in fact an intent to exploit
a child or youth. Otherwise, great hardship has been imposed
upon a defendant, without any corresponding benefit of identify-
ing, treating, or incapacitating a potential offender.
The Yanez majority expressed concerns that allowing the de-
fense of reasonable mistake as to age will "inevitable lead to the
presentation of evidence concerning the issue of consent." The de-
fendant, the Yanez majority explains, would be required to allege
not only the reasonableness of his or her mistake, but also that the
complainant consented. The prosecution would then be forced to
prove that the complainant did not consent, where consent is irrel-
evant to the crime of child molestation.326 This rationale, however,
324. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-594 at 18 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6186, 6198; Model Penal Code § 213.6 cmt. 2 at 415 (1980).
325. Indeed, there may be medical support for Attorney General Pine's observa-
tion that "young people are growing up faster." See Paul B. Kaplowitz & Sharon E.
Oberfield, 104 Pediatrics 936, Oct. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 11267395 (citing
anecdotal evidence from doctors claiming that puberty is occurring at an earlier
age).
326. See Yanez, 716 A.2d. at 770. It is far less than clear that the issue of
consent is completely irrelevant to statutory rape and child molestation, at least
insofar as the presentation of evidence is concerned. For example, in our own juris-
diction, in In re Odell, 672 A.2d 457, 458 (R.I. 1996), the juvenile, himself under
the age of 14, was adjudged delinquent based upon the finding of a Family Court
judge that he had engaged in sexual penetration with a person under the age of
fourteen. See id. The Court here held that because the child molestation statute
specifically provided that "any person" who engaged in sexual penetration with a
person under 14 was guilty of child molestation, the fact that the juvenile himself
was under 14 did not constitute a defense. See id. at 460. Here, apparently the
issue of consent evidence regarding that issue was apparently considered at trial;
the 11-year-old victim testified that she had been "sexually assaulted" by the juve-
nile and her brother on several occasions. See id; see also State v. Searles, 621
A.2d 1281, 1284 (Vt. 1993) (refusing to find error in admission of testimony regard-
ing use of force in a trial for sexual assault of a girl of 14 by three males, despite
the fact that under the relevant statute, consent was not an element of the crime:
"Absent the evidence, the sexual episodes would have appeared incomplete. The
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also does not provide a satisfactory reason to deny the defense.
Our statutory scheme in fact contemplates instances where issues
of consent and lack of consent might be considered in the same
case involving an underage complainant. Under R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-37-9, joinder of the offenses of statutory rape/child molesta-
tion along with first-degree sexual assault (i.e., forcible rape.) is
permitted.327 In any case, a defendant in Alejandro's position, who
is using reasonable mistake as to age as an affirmative defense,
has already admitted to all of the necessary elements of the
crime-sexual penetration with a person under a particular age.
All that would remain was a determination of whether the mistake
was reasonable.
The Yanez majority's final arguments against permitting the
defense were based upon the rape shield law. The Yanez majority
objected to the use of the defense even in cases involving two
youths, based on the idea that it would "open the door to the intro-
duction of evidence concerning a victim's past sexual conduct, evi-
dence that the General Assembly has already sought to restrict
through the enactment of the rape-shield statute."328 However, as
Justice Flanders correctly observes, Alejandro never attempted to
use the evidence to show consent, which the law does forbid, but
intended to impeach Allison's credibility regarding what she had
resulting gaps in the narrative would detract from its 'ring of truth.'"). In other
jurisdictions, it has been observed that prosecutors infrequently pursue cases of
consensual sexual activity between peers. However, the prosecutors will use the
consent-neutral statutory rape statutes to gain convictions where forcible rape of a
young person is alleged, but there are serious problems in proving that the com-
plainant's participation in sexual acts was not coerced. See Oberman, supra note
118, at 37.
Where Rhode Island's child molestation statute is applied to cases involving
young adolescents who both fall under its protection, the failure to fully consider
consent issues may create a problem of basic fairness. Without a determination
that one party did not consent to the activity, then, logically, we may have a mere
case in which both have committed a crime by engaging in sexual activity with a
person who is under the threshold age. However, only the party charged is being
punished. See State v. McGovern, 1998 WL 252236, at *4 (R.I. Super.) (criticizing
the use of the former statutes forbidding oral and anal sex in order to gain convic-
tions in cases of adult sexual assault where evidence of lack of consent was weak).
327. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-9 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
328. Yanez, 716 A.2d at 700 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-3 (1956) (1994
Reenactment)).
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said to Alejandro about her age. Using such past history in credi-
bility challenges is permitted under the law.32 9
Flanders also argues that knowledge might acceptably be used
as substantive evidence to show the reasonableness of mistake-
provided, of course that Alejandro knew about it and relied upon
it.330 Using evidence regarding a complainant's sexual past as
part of a reasonable mistake of fact defense may present other
challenges. First, the use of such evidence may cause the reason-
able mistake of fact as to age defense to degenerate into a "promis-
cuity defense" for statutory rape, which was formerly permitted in
many states, and is now considered virtually untenable.331 Sec-
ondly, it has also been suggested that the young complainant's sex-
ual conduct probably should not be used substantively as a reliable
indicator of reasonable mistake as to age, as sexual promiscuity in
complainant's of Allison's age may well be the result of previous
abuse.332
Whatever the ultimate policy decision on this issue, the Yanez
majority's focus on this issue as a basis for denying the defense in
this case is somewhat of an exaggeration, as many other factors
were offered to support Alejandro's claim of reasonable mistake as
to Allison's age. Alejandro offered testimony as to Allison's physi-
cal development, appearance, and ability to communicate, as well
as her own representations and the belief of others.333 As for fu-
ture cases, many other factors will obviously be used to support a
defense of reasonable mistake as to age-or, for that matter, un-
dermine a false claim-such as the complainant's apparent level of
intellectual development, poise, association with older persons,
employment, activities, presence in areas such as drinking estab-
lishments, and the representations of persons associated with
329. See, eg., State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 909-10 (R.I. 1998) (permitting
admission of evidence regarding teenager's pregnancy by her boyfriend as evidence
of source of sexual knowledge allowing her to make complaint).
330. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 773 n.14 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
331. See Oberman, supra note 118, at 26. Some modern courts in fact still per-
mit the sexual "aggressiveness" of the complainant as a mitigating factor to be
considered in sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Rush, 942 P.2d 55 (Kan. Ct. App.
1997).
332. See Oberman, supra note 118, at 35 & n. 109 (citing Catherine Stevens-
Simon & Susan Reichert, Sexual Abuse, Adolescent Pregnancy and Child Abuse: A
Deuelopmental Approach to an Intergenerational Cycle, 148 Archives of Pediatrics
and Adolescent Medicine 23 (Jan. 1994)).
333. See Discussion at IIA, supra.
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her-none of which are matters covered under the rape shield
statute.
Thus, it becomes apparent that imposing strict liability as to a
complainant's age only marginally advances the goal of protecting
youths and children from sexual abuse. Furthermore, the Yanez
majority was unable to advance any other policy argument that
would support the blanket denial of the defense. On the other
hand, as we have seen in Yanez, the potential cost of imposing
strict liability is grave: somebody who has not shown any propen-
sity to abuse children or youths will be subjected to harsh penalties
and exposure to social disgrace mandated by the statute. Clearly,
then, strict liability as to age is an archaic, ineffective and danger-
ous tool when applied to the task of preventing sexual abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite a matured understanding regarding when it is appro-
priate for a court to construe a statute to impose strict criminal
liability, despite earlier holdings that specifically stated that statu-
tory rape/child molestation was not a strict liability crime, and de-
spite the fact that strict liability has little practical purpose in
effectuating the purposes of statutory rape/child molestation provi-
sions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has persisted in maintain-
ing the position that reasonable mistake as to age is not available
to those accused of the serious offense of statutory rape/child mo-
lestation. Instead, the Yanez majority asserts that the question
must be decided by the General Assembly.334 Since the Yanez de-
cision, however, the General Assembly has completed one legisla-
tive session and begun another, apparently without considering
the fact that yet another youth may find himself in the same cruel
plight as Alejandro. Therefore, we now suggest that the General
Assembly amend the statutes regarding statutory rape and child
molestation to permit the defense of reasonable mistake as to age.
Vicki J. Bejma
334. See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 770-71.
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